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CAMBODIA: A POLITICAL SURVEY 
Michael Vickery 
The 'Peace Procea' leading to elections 
The 1993 election and new Comtituent ARmbJy mst the ~nning of a i;mse 
in Cambodia's modem bisttty as audal as the deposltioo of Sihanouk in 1970 
which began Dine years of war and revolution, the revolutiooary vkDy of 191S, 
and the des1ructioo of Democratic Xamplchea (the 'Pol Pot Regime'' 'Khmer 
Rooge') by VJemam in 1979. 
TheParis Agreement, under which this election was held, was thecntmina-
tion of a long ~ of harassment and negotiation begun soon after the 
overthrow of Pol Pot in 1979. Read carefully, it seems to have been designed to 
ensure furtbec destablHUltion rather than luting peace. It is the last stage in the 
intemational r.ampatgn to desttoy the PRK/SOC1 as part of the US vendetta 
against Vietnam. Negotiations reached this stage bec.ause the PRK refused to 
dissolve as had beeniredlctedforten years, anditwasreaJiudtbatthePRK was 
a relative success, not a VJe.tr>amese Front; that the Vietnamese army was really 
leaving; and that the new Cambodian state could not be defeated militarily by 
its enemies. 
When it was seen that the PRK - which by 1981 had a constitution, a 
national assembly chosen in an election, and a new government structure of 
genuine Khmer elements, not just disguised Vietnamese - could not be 
destroyed by recycling the Khmer Rouge and creating new contra groups (some 
ofwhichwerethenucleiforSonSann'sKPNLFandSJbanouk'sFUNCINPEC), 
theintemational community in 1982 cobbled together the three-party Coalition 
Government of Democratic Kampucbea (CGDK}, tak:lng the name of Pol Pot's 
'Khmer Rouge' regime. This sttaDge aeature, a shotgun marriage of three 
partners whose mutual hatred was only exceeded by tbdr antipltby forthePRK 
and Vietnamese, and all of whom at one time or another bad been rejected by 
the Cambodian nation, received intemational recognition and Cambodia's UN 
1 
Digitized by Goog I e 
seat, thus setting the stage b'the comedy of the next few years; during this time 
the government that steadily imp'oved the conditions of its people was treated 
as a pariah, while the contras beame legitimate Cambodia. 2 
1be contra coalition was peserved only by iDcreasiDg b'dgn aid. While 
able to blow up bridges, attack civilian ttai.Ds, and murder afewpeopleba:e and 
there, their military success was never Jmpessive. 1be confidence of the PRK 
side was shown by the annual witbdrawalsofVlefnaJJM11$Ctroopl, which by 1983 
we.re UDdoubtedly under way, an inaeasiDgly Khmer administration, particu-
larly aftertheSthPartyCongressin 198S, andgradual,evealfllmited,polltical 
relaxation within Cambodia. 
At the same time, changes in geopolitics, in particular in Sino-Soviet 
relations, meant that China's int.erest in the Khmer Rouge was decreasing; and 
the ostensible reason b' their SUpp<J.1, VJetnalDP$C 'occupation', was disap-
pearing. By 1988 therewasseriousreasontobopetbatsomeintluential Western 
country, perhaps Australia m France, which were the most positively engaged 
in Cambodia, would 1x'eak ranks and recognize the PRK. Had any such 
government bad the courage, that act might well have ended the 'Cambodia 
Problem', and the frightful muddle of 1992-93 would never have come about' 
Australian Senator Gareth Evans has apparently argued agaimt this propo-
sition, saying that the 'Khmer Rouge could not effectively be excluded from a 
political settlement through the mechanism of extending recognition to the 
SOC' (Frost 1991: 147, citingEvans). Thereasoningwastbat 'the Khmer Rouge 
cannot be effectively isolated and margiDa1ised with their military influence 
nullified. so long as it coottnues to be supplied, espedally by China, with arms 
and money and diplomatic suppcxt', and Clinabad maintah>ed that 'it will give 
acommitJilellttoceasemllitarysupport. .• onlyinthecontextofacomprebenslve 
settlement agreed by all four Cambodian parties ...• unless and until China is 
prepared to withdraw •.. whatever Australiaand~oountties choose to do, the 
continuationofthebloodywarisinevitable'(ibid.quotingastatementbyEvans, 
6 December 1990). 
Certain important points were neglected by Evans. Thep-oblem since 1979 
bad not been the 'isolation' and 'marginaliza1ioo' of the Khmer Rouge.1batbad 
been accomplished by the Vietnamese in 1979, after which the Khmer Rouge 
were with all deliberation revived, rearmed and pushed onto centre stage with 
an aid program involving intemational cooperation, in particular among China, 
2 
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the United States and lballand, with Australia following faithfully behind the 
US once Senator Evans had become minister fer Foreign Affairs. In spite of this 
the new PRK. though cut off from most of the werld, bad developed sufficient 
military capability to combat the Khmer Rouge rather effectively (even after 
Vit>Jnamese trooops left. more than a year before the remarks of Senatm Evans). 
Recognition of thePRKby Western countries. then as now. would have enabled 
them to re-marginalize the Khmer Rouge. whatever Odnese desires, particu-
larly as Chinese policy gradually changed in conformity with changes in 
Chlna•s national interests. 
By the late 1980s the real leader of the anti-PRK vendetta was not China, 
but the United States. It was not fear of Chinese reaction wblch prevented 
recognition of the PRK. 1be US had no fear of offending Odna (er Thailand. 
through which Chinese aid tothe Khmer Rouge must pass) on other issues. such 
as human rights. int.ellectual property er trade imbalances; the pressure was 
sometimes aude and offensive. But not the least objection was expressed about 
Chinese and 1bal aid to the Khmer Rouge.' 
US foot-<lragging. in comparison to Chines flexibility. was seen most 
clearly near the end, at the time of the Pattaya meeting of Auguat 1991. the 
meeting at which ail parties agreed to what they would sign in Paris two montm 
later. 
By that time it was clear that everyone else, from Phnom Penh to Peking. 
except possibly the Khmer Rouge. had found a fcrmula which could become a 
signed peace agreement Even though Phnom Penh bad been forced to give 
away almost everything but their fcrmal existence, the US objected that it was 
not the 'comprehensive• solution which had been sought, to the extent that Hun 
Seo. Sihanouk, and other parties complained about the US attitude. 
It was reported that 'Phnom Penh government officials increasingly view 
China. •. as the best hope fer ending 12 years of war .. .'; 'China has been doing its 
best'; and 'the officials said they viewed Odoa's softening stance toward them 
as part of a changing wood political order'. No such 'softening stance• was 
perceived on the part of the US: 'Phnom Penh fears the United States could 
impede Cambodian peace efforts by insisting that a United Nations peace plan 
be followed to the letter'. Sihanouk also feared this, urging 'W asbington to be 
''realistic" and ''flexible" taking into account the true situation in Cambodia'. 
and the fact that, according to him, 'France, China and lballand have been 
3 
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supportive of the "compromise solution"'. Hun Sen also expressed worries, 
saying '"some foreign countries" might slow down progress', apparently 
'directing his comments at the United States, which is reluctant to 
accept •. amendments', although China and Fnmce. .. bave jolDed lballand in 
saying they are prepared to accept any compromise solution adopted by the 
Cambodians'. 'lbe journalists' ubiquitous favourite. the 'Bangkok-hued dip-
lomat' also fretted about 'the remarkably slow speed taken by ... especially the 
United States ... [and] ''this kind of attitude could impede the peace process"'; 
while a colleague thought 'the US reluctant to see the Cambodian conftict 
resolved outside the lines it has drawn. .. [because] Washington has raised a 
comprehensive settlement in Cambodia as one oondltion fer full normalization 
of ties with Vietnam'. Even 'a Cambodian resistance source said it seemed the 
Americans "are digging their own grave .. Jf it [the United States] remain the 
only one ... to oppose the Cambodian approach to find their own solutions. it 
could be viewed as trying to infringe upon a small nadons's soverdgnty'" .5 
Finally it was clear to all that the US claim over the past ten years to be 
following ASEAN on Cambodia was asmokesaeen. 'lbe US had been pushing. 
not following, ASEAN, perhaps even China. 
It was not. in the end, China's support ferthe Khmer Rouge which held back 
a Cambodian peace agreement, but the US position (see Vickery 1991); and 
when the Chinese were freed from US pressure by the peace agreement, they 
were eager to develop good relations with Phnom Penh and provide generous 
aid, while the US still grumbled about its 'road map'. Chinese diplomats 
returned to their old embassy in Phnom Penh; offered a token payment to the 
SOC fer taking care of it; pledged humanitarian aid; and were reported to be 
planning 'technical and financial resources to reactivate Cambodia's discarded 
[sic] industries ... [of which] flve ... were built with aid from Beijing in the 
past. ... While other countries ... build up their presence ... slowly and cautiously. 
Sino-Cambodian ties have already begun to flourish'. This ls not, mereover. a 
suddenreversalofpositionlmposedonChloabythepeaceagreement.ltappears 
that the 'Chinese reappearance on the scene ... was the result of calculated 
diplomatic moves begun in September 1990durlng peace talks in Jakarta, where 
representatives of Phnom Penh and Beijing met fer the first time' (Kavi 
Cbongkittavom in~ Nalion 20 November 1991). 
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An Intriguing piece of evidence about the nature of US involvement in the 
peace process was published after thePattayaconference by the well-connected 
Thai journalist Kavi Chongldttavom: 'At the end of May 1990, one of Gen 
Chatichai Choonhavan's policy advisers, Pansak. Vinyarat. seaetiy flew to 
Rome to meet with a senior US official to werk out a linkage between the setting 
up of a Supreme National Council in Cambodia and a ceasefire agreement' 
(Kavi Chongkittavorn in The Nation 23 October 1991). Whal role did the US 
have in that discussion? For whom was the US speaking? Whose ceasing of fire 
could they influence? 1be Khmer faction on whom the US is believed to have 
hadthemostleverage,SonSann's KPNLF, wasofsolittlesigniftcancethatthey 
could be ignored. General Chatichai' s adviser could only have been concerned 
about US pressure on Thailand, or US influence, direct or indirect, on the 
Khmer Rouge, perhaps via US cormections with China. 
Equally intriguing was the timing of a visit to Thailand by 'deputy assistant 
for public relations to the US president Sichan Siv', who was feted by Thai 
Foreign Affairs Minister Arsa Sarasin rather than by a Thai public relations 
official, and whose visit was announced only on the 'Society' page of the 
Bangkok Post, without comment in the general news or political pages. Sichan 
Siv is a former US-based official of the KPNLF, and his visit occurred just 
before the Pattaya conference. 6 Whal special instructions from President Bush 
to the Thai government with respect to Cambodia was Sichan Siv transmitting? 
Was it related to Son Sann's last-minute efforts to delay the settlement, er to 
ways of using the split between Son San and the military wing of the KPNLF 
under General Sak Sutsakhan, one of the Cambodian military who was close to 
the US during 1970-75, and who in 1991 appeared unhappy with the peace 
agreements and the exclusion of his faction from the Supreme National Council 
(SNC)?7 
In view of their record since 1975, the alleged concern of 'a few Western 
nations with high human rights values ... alarmed with the strong possibility of 
a return of the genocidal Khmer Rouge .... [and] the United States, Britain and 
Australia ... at the forefront in warning the delegates of the Paris International 
Conference on Cambodia' (The Nation [Bangkok] 25 October 1991), er pious 
'statements before the signing ceremony [when] the foreign ministers of the US, 
Britain, and Australia underscored the brutality of the Khmer Rouge rule' 
(Bangkok Post 29 October 1991 ), or 'Bush "express[ing] our on-going concern" 
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about the possibility that the murderous Khmer Rouge might once again 
dominate Cambodian politics• (Los Angeles Times 25 September 1991). seem 
hardly worth the newsprint on which they appear. 
The reason f<X' the inventing the 'Peace Process• was not to marginalb:e the 
Khmer Rouge, nor to end a war, but to forestall the danger of PRK victory. <X' 
its recognition. This meant that the intemadonal diplomatic campaign against 
the PRK was aanked up a couple of notches. It proceeded through the Jakarta 
Informal Meetings beginning in July 1988. ow.tings in Tokyo. Bangkok, and 
Pattaya, and three draft agreements before the signatures of October 1991. The 
'Peace Process' was an element of the Nicaragua Strategy which the US had 
worked on that country - political isolation. economic blockade, supp<X't f<X' 
•contras' just aat>SS the border. resulting in economic disintegration. decllning 
standards of human rights. and political disaffection within the target country, 
until, in an election. the targetted party loses (Vickery 1991). • 
In all of the various proposals and formats the principal demands made by 
opponents of the PRK centred on withdrawal of the Vietnamese troopS in 
Cambodia and free elections. An assumption behind this emphasis was that the 
PRKexisted only by virtue of the Vietnamese. Once the Vietnamese were gone, 
the reasoning went. the PRK would quickly fall, and in free elections the present 
PRK leaders would stand no chance. As it gradually became clear that the PRK 
would not just fade away. the proposals called f<X' formation of a coalition 
government among the PRK and its Cambodian enemies. 
In the face of clear Vietnamese intentions to get out fast, ASEAN began to 
engage in delaying tactics. Just before the first Jakarta lnf<X'mal Meeting in July 
1988, an ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Joint Communiqu6 (as though there had 
beennochangessince 1979),expressed 'deepconcemoverthecontinuedlllegal 
occupation of Kampuchea by Vietnamese military forces', which by then had 
already deaeued from 200.000 to 50-70,000. A subtle new approach was the 
foreign ministers' 'call f<X' a durable and comprehensive political settlement in 
Kampuchea which will lead to the total witbdrawal .•. undel' lnte.matlonal su-
pervision' ('ASEAN Joint Communiqu6•. The Nalion [Bangkok] 6 July 1988 
[emphasis added]).9 
The Vietnamese were not to be permitted to just leave, and the ASEAN 
foretgnmlnisterswereevenseekingtodelaytbe.irdepartureuntilnewmachinery 
could be set up to undel'mine the PRK. As Indonesian Foreign Minister All 
6 
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Alatas told a 1bai journalist. the question is DO loDger just 'the UDilateral 
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops', but withdrawal 'in a context of an overall 
comprehensive solution', meaning within a framework supervised by those 
powers which desired a change in the Cambodian government. What was really 
causing concern was not the Vietnamese troops, whose numbers weredwindllDg, 
but PRK durability. ASEAN even seemed to be calling fer another foreign 
occupation, named the 'International Peacelceeping Force', in the embarrassing 
event of areal VJetnamesewithdrawal. 'lbe US also chimed in with 'uncertainty 
about VJetnamese intentions' and the 'direct threat to Thailand of continuing 
Vietnamese occupation' (The Nation [Bangkok] 6, 8, 10 July 1988; Banglco1c 
Post, 2 July 1988). 
1be enemies of the PRK were caught in a dilemma created by a too-wishful 
belief in their own propaganda. Behind all of the moves since 1979 was a 
conviction that the PRK could never become anything more than a Vietnamese 
puppet state, without any national base, which would collapse as soon as the 
Vietnamese could be made to leave, of course unwillingly. 'lbe mainteDance of 
this view against all the accumulating evidence to the contrary resulted from a 
rare dialectical reinforcement between official US and ASEAN disinformation 
and house-broken journalists who, with witless reverence, repeated whatever 
their favourite 'Western diplomats' said, until apparently they all came to 
believe their own propaganda. Ultimately they could not avoid perceiving that 
the Vietnamese really intended to leave; and embarrassment was caused by the 
sudden realization that thePRK was areal Cambodian government which might 
survive. 
The position of the anti-PRK parties at the end of 1988 was that the PRK 
must not be allowed to survive the Vietnamese withdrawal as government of 
Cambodia. The international settlement planned to precede er coJDCide with the 
Vietnamese withdrawal would require replacement of the PRK with a four-
power coalition (DK, KPNLF, Sihanouk, PRK) in which DO party would be 
dominant, and the arrangement would be assured by an international force. 
Naturally the PRK refused to dissolve itself after having rather successfully 
governed fer ten years. PRKleaders agreed to some kind of participation of their 
enemies, minus eight DK leaders, in a new government which would be in fact 
an enlarged PRK. They also agreed to hold elections under intematiODal 
observation and to abide by the results even if they lost their dominant position. 
7 
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Together with this was a warning that by 1990 at the latest the Vietnamese forces 
would be gone. and then the problem would have resolved itself and would no 
longer require any concessions to the coalldon. 10 1beJr apparent success in 
building an army. the restoration of agriculture to near self-sutDciency. and the 
impetus to economic growth provided by the new encouragement fer some 
privatization after 1988 indicated that this was not an kDe threat. 
The Paris Accord incorporated most of the anti-SOC provisiODS of the draft 
agreements devised by Western states, starting with the Australian 'Redbook.' 
of February 1990, whose authors thanked US Congressman Stephen Solarz and 
Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and no one else, fer inspiration. No more ardent 
enemies of Phnom Penh. outside of the Khmer Rouge leadership, could be 
imagined. II 
The Australian Peace~ started with the assumption that the State of 
Cambodia government in Phnom Penh and the Coalition Government of 
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) were of equal stature and legitimacy. and its 
preferred option was fer a Supreme National Council consisting of 'represen-
tatives of the four parties [three of them within the CGDK], explicitly structured 
on a quadripartite basis', which would hold 'all government authority', and 
'would irrevocably devolve all thatgovernmeotauttmty-legislative, exeadive 
and judicial - to the UN Seaetary-Genetal' (DFAT 1990:12, IS). Most 
peculiarly, in its 'Working Paper n•. which 'gives an account of the existing 
structure of the civil administrations in Cambodia'. the 'National Government 
of Cambodia' (the CGDK) is given p-ecedence and to the extent possible is 
described, like the State of Cambodia, as having a constitution, a ministerial 
structure, civil servants, and a provincial administration (ibid.:21-24). 
The most reasonable draft proposal was the August 1990 UN 'Framework' 
(UN 1990). It was what its title said, a 'Framework'. and it permitted joint 
discussions among all Cambodian factions concerning '[t]hecompositionof the 
SNC, including the selection and number of its members'. who 'should be 
composed of representative individuals with authority among the Cambodian 
people [ and] ... acceptable to each other' (ibid. :7-8). This gave Cambodians, in 
principle, cooslderable control over their fate, and that may have been why the 
'Big Rve'. before there had been time to get intra-Cambodian discussions 
started, rushed through their November 1990 'Proposed Structure', 12 with very 
detailed decisions about administration and election modalities imposed on the 
a 
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Cambodians, in particular imposed on the SOC which already had a functioning 
government, but wloe dissolution was implicit in the 'Proposed Structure'. 
What did the Paris Accord mean politically? At worst the State of Cambodia 
appeared to have signed away its existence. If the agreement had been read 
literally, and enforced in that interpretation, the UN would have been able to 
control five key ministries: Interi<X', Defense, Anance, Foreign Affairs, and 
Information, on the grounds that those ministries could influence the election; 
the UN couldalsohavedecidedunilaterallythatotherministriesa:-departments 
must be taken under tutelage fa:- the same reason. 1bat control was never 
exercised, however, and the SOC administration remained intact. bringing 
accusations from the anti-SOC factions that UNT AC was not implementing the 
Paris Accord, and was in fact favouring SOC. 
Organizing for electiom 
Under the Paris ACCCX'd the electiom were stacked, as far as pcmible, against the 
SOC. After much protest they signed fer pupcrtional representadon by provinre, 
contrary to former Cambodian practice, a fcrmula designed to give the maximum 
chanoo to their enemies, in particular the Khmer Rouge, and to any odu parties 
fcrmed. The agreement irovided that any group of 5,<XX> persom could be 
registeted as a political party, and the multi-party system which was acrepted, 
both in the agreements and in the new Cambodian People's Party pugram. had 
the potential to produre an incompetent legislature and an impcmlt government. 
Furthermore, Cambodian voters were restricted to choosing party slates, not 
individual candidates. This may be a good system in a country with stable 
government, an educated population, and well-known, ideologically-based 
parties, all of which were lacking in Cambodia. A plausible interpretation of this 
arrangement by the Big Five was that SOC candidates were expected to be local 
administrators, many of whom may have had good records, or at least were 
known; whereas the candidates of parties deriving from FUNCINPEC <X' 
KPNLF, a:- formed by returned emigres, would be unknown, and if their 
backgrounds were discovered, many might be less popular among voters than 
even mediocre SOC candidates. In some cases, the result was that voters did not 
know the identities of the people for whom they were ostensibly voting. It is 
uncertain whether lists of candidates in Kluner were posted in <X' near all polling 
9 
Digitized by Goog I e 
places, a task which was the responsibility of the Cambodian parties. UNT AC 
prepared lists of the candidates of all parties in &glish, but the transaiption of 
many names was so eccentric that it could have disoriented specialists - for 
example, 'Sam Souberdo' for 'Son Soubert'. Apparently UNT AC did not seek 
competent advice on Khlner tramllteratlon conventions." 
'lbe most dangerous joke, however, was the provision that anyone born in 
Cambodia, and their children, wherever born. if aged 18 or over, could vote. This 
implied that all refugees overseas aged 18 or more-even if they had never seen 
Cambodia, did not speak the language, and were citizens of another country-
might vote. Such practice would not be accepted anywhere in the world, and 
forcing it on Cambodia Illustrates the malevolence of those members of the 
international community who were responsible for the texts of the new agree-
ments. 1be purpose was to garner as many anti-SOC votes as possible, for it was 
well known that most of the refugees would vote against Phnom Penh. In what 
was certainly an oversight. the text also implied that all the Vietnamese born in 
Cambodia and now resident in Vietnam, and their children, perhaps up to half 
a million persons, could also vote. As could have been predicted, this forced a 
change in the rules, to stipulate that a voter must be a 'Cambodian person', 
defined as a person born in Cambodia, at least one of whose parents was born 
in Cambodia; or a person. wherever born, at least one of whose parents was born 
in Cambodia and had a parent also born there. This still permitted most 
Cambodian refugees to vote, if they returned to Cambodia to register, a 
stipulation which discouraged all but the most committed. In fact, few refugees 
took the trouble to register and vote, far too few to affect the outcome. 1' 
1be zeal to undermine the SOC meant that the Paris Agreement favoured 
the Khlner Rouge, as they themselves gleefully recognized. In the transcript of 
a talk by Pol Pot to a group of cadres in February 1992, leaked to the SOC and 
distributed to foreign journalists in December 1992, Pol Pot emphasized the 
advantages which they derived from the Agreement, and complained about the 
delay in setting up UNTAC, which be felt would permit the favourable 
application of the Agreement and protect the Khlner Rouge from hostility by 
UNAMIC under the French General Loridon. Pol Pot's remarks indicate that be 
considered Loridon a serious threat which would disappear with the arrival of 
UNT AC, an assessment on which he was proved correct. We may be sure be 
considered Loridon's removal a great favour. 15 I must emphasi7.e that my pur-
10 
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pose in saying this ls only to publldu the Khmer Rouge attitude at the time. not 
to say that UN forces should have gone to war with them. Even if such a 
campaign had been successful, it might have been counterproducive because of 
the destruction and the Cambodian deaths which would have been caused. 
Other weaknesses emphasized by Pol Pot were the end of Chinese aid, and 
the defection of KPNLF and FUNCINPEC elements from the tripartite coali-
tion. Sihanouk was unreliable, and 'went around the bend' in moments of stress, 
and Ranariddh. Pol Pot felt, might move toward the PRK/SOC. 
Nevertheless, once UNT AC under Akashl arrived, the KR incessantly 
complained, first, that UNT AC did not take over the government as the Paris 
Accord allowed, and seconclly, that UNT AC did not supervise withdrawal of the 
Vietnamese who still allegedly occupied Cambodia and dominated the gov-
ernment. These complaints were part of a strategy outlined by Pol Pot in his 
February talk. and it appears he had mistakenly interpreted the Paris Accord as 
setting up an equal four-party regime under the SNC. In part, the sense of Pol 
Pot's assessment of the Paris Agreement as favouring them was that it permitted 
their policy of stonewalling on those two points. 1bere was no mention at all in 
Pol Pot's talk of the election. 
The Khmer Rouge were assigned, though not explicitly, a particular role in 
the plans to destroy the PRK/SOC. In arguments such as that of Evans cited 
above, concern about the 'Red Khlner' was a red hening. 1bey were needed as 
the ever-present threat to keep Phnom Penh from simply going its own way; and 
by 1990, in spite of relative success on the battlefield, the SOC knew they could 
not maintain sufficient military force agaimt the Khmer Rouge who still 
received foreign aid. During the negotiations throughout the 1980s it was as-
serted that the Khlner Rouge were too strong to be excluded, even if they were 
abhorred. Phnom Penh denied that, and said the problem was foreign support for 
the Khmer Rouge; now we know they were right. After the agreement was 
signed, there was even some noise from the US, blaming SOC for agreeing to 
association with the Kluner Rouge, and American insistence that they would 
never recogniu a government in which the Khmer Rouge were included. 
Phnom Penh was conned. Once the international community had forced them 
to accept the Khlner Rouge, it was their faction which started to get the blame. 
A journalist commented on the possible future of Pen Sovan that he is 'the only 
noteworthy Cambodian politician untainted by the current Phnom Penh 
11 
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government's cooperation with the Kluner Rouge in the peace plan', that is, by 
the acceptance of the Khmer Rouge into the new coalition which was forced on 
Phnom Penh by the Big Five. 16 And the US Congress. with its typical perspi-
cacity, grumbled about paying the US share of a UN operation If the Khmer 
Rouge wu Included (The Nation S December 1991). In Phnom Penh in June 
1992 I was told by one of Hun Sen' s associates that before his trip to the US in 
Marcll. Solomoo warned him that he would face hard questioning from 
Congress about the Kluner Rouge in the new SNC. 
Loridon had to be removed to prevent the destruction of the Khmer Rouge 
before they had served their purpose. His removal meant that UNT AC would 
never enforce 'phase 2'. A year later, as an excuse to avoid enforcement. 
someone provided Akashl with an assessment that the Kluner Rouge were a 
great risk to the elections: 'the KR are stronger than before'; 'their military 
strength has increased by at leut SO per cent. they have new weapons. they are 
operating in larger units, they are led by leaders who are more extteme than In 
past years. so we have to be prepared' (The Nation 20 May 1993, citing a 
statement by Akashi). It ls now clear that this wu all nonsense, but it wu 
necessary in order to counter the declining estimates of Khmer Rouge sttength 
which might have undermined the role in which they had been cast. 17 
The Kluner Rouge are now collapsing under attack from the new Cambo-
dian government; estimates of their strength after the election fell once and for 
all from over 30,000 to 10,000 or even less, just about what the PRK was saying 
In 1988-90, and there has been no identification. or even mention. of new 
leaders. Akashi was no doubt disinformed. probably by one of the pecullar 
analyses for which his own '[Dis] Information and Education Component' 
became famous. 11 Had there been no Kluner Rouge, the PRK/SOC could not 
have been defeated with the 'peace process' mechanism. 
By May 1993 It seemed that the 'free and fair Internationally supervised 
election' would take place in the worst possible conditions. The Democratic 
Kampuchea (DK) group. or 'Kluner Rouge'. had withdrawn from the election. 
with a spurious claim that a crucial clause of the Agreement. withdrawal of 
Vietnamese armed forces, had not been observed. and it appeared that they had 
convinced a large part of the populace of the truth of that claim. The same theme 
was taken up by FUNCINPEC, and even more stridently by Son Sann. 
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Violence, among the parties, against Vietnamese, and among the citi7.emy, 
all armed in the American and Thai laissez-faire style, was generalb:ed. The 
economy, which in spite of the US-led blockade, showed slow, steady progress 
from 1980 to 1988, had collapsed since the peace agreement had been signed, 
and a wide wealth gap, which PRK/SOC policy up to 1988 had tried to prevent, 
had brought misery to much of the population. 
Twenty parties were accepted for registration by the UNT AC Electoral 
Component Few of them, perhaps fortunately, appeared serious. Seven were 
founded by people who had spent most of the last 10-20 years in the United 
States or France. Most of the party names were permutations of a few ell~ -
Democracy, Republican, Neutralist etc.; and their platforms consisted of praise 
for everything good - democracy. freedom, human rights, social welfare, 
peace, and of course a free market economy - without conaete policies to 
achieve such virtues. The party logos, which appeared prominently on the ballot 
papers, ostensibly as a guide for illlterate votecs, were equally complex and 
confusing, most constituted by a multiplicity of intertwined symbols. One new 
party leader, returned from the US, showed his level of realism by raising the 
American flag over his office and hanging a picture of George Bush on the 
wall.'9 
The serious parties were the Phnom Penh government• sCambodianPeoples 
Party (CPP),FUNCINPECunderSihanouk' sson Norodom Ranariddh, and two 
branches of the famer KPNLF of Son Sann, his own BLDP and Sak.Sutsak.han' s 
LOP. If the Kluner Rouge had not rejected participation, they also would have 
been serious contenders, if only because they would probably have had total 
control over the votes of 10-15 percent of the population. We must not forget 
that in spite of their refusal to open their zones to UNT AC, to canton their troops, 
and partially disarm, the door was left open for them to participate in the election 
until virtually the last minute. 
Still another party with a serious name and leader was Le Parti Democrat of 
In Tam, although it was difficult to guess what attraction its candidates might 
have for voters in 1993. The Democrat Party was the strongest party of pre-
independence Cambodia, winning all the country• s past free elections, in 1946, 
1947, and 1951, on a platfonn of pluralism, nationalism, understood if 
unexpressed resistance tothe monarchy, and a covert goal of full independence, 
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including sympathy for Cambodian, and Vietnamese, guerrillas fighting against 
the French (Vickery 1982; Chandler 1991 ). They were destroyed by government 
bara&weotafterSihanouk' s victayof 1955, butuntll 1975 they wereremembered 
with sympathy by politically conscious Cambodians, in particular the educated 
middle class, survivors of which made up a large section of the PRK/SOC 
second- and third-level administrators. In Tam himself was not one of the 
original Democrats, but he helped revive the party in opposition to Lon Nol in 
1971-72, ran against the latter for president in 1972, and peihaps lost because 
of dishonest ballot counting. At least he gained cooslderable popularity at the 
time. Aft.er 1979 he organized an armed force on the 1bal border, was one of the 
founders of FUNCINPEC, then renounced warmongering and in 1988 returned 
to visit Phnom Penh in a manner indicating support for the PRK. His new Parti 
Democrat looked like a potential collaborator with the Phnom Penh government 
party in an eventual coalltion. » 
During the last half of 1992 it appeared that no party would win a majority, 
and most observers were betting on the election resulting in a coalition of 
Ranariddh'sAJNONPEC andHunSen'sCambodianPeoplesParty,orevenon 
a pre-election coalition. At least that ls what people who did not desire chaos 
hoped for. The SOC was the only group with a national admlnlstratlvecapabillty, 
and Ranariddh, of all other party leaders, had been making the most conciliatory 
and rational noises, notably opposing violence against the Vietnamese. A 
debaclebySOC,desiredbytheUDitedStates,leavingacoalltionofFUNCINPEC 
and the ex-KPNLF parties, or dther or all of them with the refugee parties, 
would have been a disaster. Defection of Ranarlddh from the tripartite coalition 
including the Kluner Rouge, and a coalltion between AJNCINPEC and the 
CPP, was a major concern of Pol Pot as expressed in his February 1992 talk, and 
be was insistent that efforts must be made to prevent it 
One striking feature of the platforms of most parties was lack of any 
reference to Cambodia's traditional royalty. With the exception of one small 
explicitly Royalist Party and FUNONPEC,it would appear that the parties were 
republican, as could be expected from the backgrounds of those leaders whose 
previous political activities are known. 
Because of this, the enthusiasm for Sihanouk since the election seems 
opportunistic, and shows that no group has sufficient political imagination to 
escape from tradition. Or rather, even if they do not like Sihanouk, they are 
returning to traditional Cambodian politics (see below and see Thion 1993). 
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Election predictions 
After 1992 the burgeoning cooperation betwe.enfUNCINPEC andtheCPP 
broke down with accusations of CPP responsibility for attacks on, and kiJUngs 
of, FUNCINPEC personnel. Oear guilt was demonstrated in only a few cases, 
and it must not be forgotten that such cooperation was anathema to two 
important players, the Kluner Rouge and the United States. The CPP, in 
particularHunSen,hadnoreasootoinitiateattacksonfUNCINPECuntilitwas 
clear that the latte.r had declared their enmity; and Hun Sen's assertions that 
some of the attacks were Khlner Rouge provocation or internal FUNCINPEC 
feuding were not unreasonable. 
In early May most predictions were that the CPP would at least come first, 
perhaps with a small absolute majority. 
1llis was the prediction even of the two American 'Democracy institutes' 21 
whose members were personally hostile to SOC. In their seminar for interna-
tional election observers on 21 May, one of them warned that the post-election 
period could be the most dangerous for those who worked against the SOC, 
because CPP was expected to win the largest number of seats, and thus to 
dominate the new government 
Gareth Evans also reluctantly made a similar assessment, saying the Khmer 
Rouge were not just non-cooperative, but were making an 'active attempt at 
disruption and discrediting the outcome'. If the pro-Sihanouk group woo, the 
Kluner Rouge would hold back from violence and try to negotiate reconciliation 
and participation. 'If, on the other hand, as is possibly a little more likely, the 
Hun Sen people gained a clear majority'. the Khlner Rouge might consider 
further insurgency etc. 22 1bat was no doubt true, because Hun Sen was saying 
that if he won he would wipe them out, while FUNCINPEC was explicitly 
conciliatory. Evans's statement illustrates the role assigned the Khlner Rouge, 
which I evoked above. 
A journalist reporting from Kompong Cham, the largest constituency, 
wrote, 'Rival political parties [citing the Liberal Democrats, a breakaway group 
from Son Sann's KPNLF] .. .say they believe the Phnom Penh government will 
win. .. .' (Chris Burslem in The Nalion 13May1993); andevensomefUNCINPEC 
leaders doubted their party's sttength, as was seen in the defection of three of 
their generals to CPP just a few days before the election. They said the reason 
for changing sides was disapproval of Ranariddh, who had taken over from 
IS 
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Sihanouk. and wu cooperating with the Khmer Rouge, but it is more likely that 
their defe.ction meant they thought the CPP wu going to win the best result in 
theelection and dominate the post~ectiongovemmem, probably with Sihanouk. 
whom they had willingly served, usome kind of honorary chief of state or king. 
One of them, Sou Kim Sun, had been aFUNCINPEC division commander, and 
chief of FUNCINPEC's election campaign In Phnom Penh. where he wu a 
candidate. 25 His defection must have been particularly embarrassing. 
The CPP officially proclaimed that they expected a 60-70per cent majority, 
and their reworking of the candidate lists after the election suggests they 
believed it (see below). 
One very peculiar analysis in the opposite direction, made in January 1993, 
gave the CPP only fourth place with a mere 9 per cent support. behind 
FUNCINPEC with 30per cent, the BLDP with 18.S per cent, and the Democrats 
with 10 per cent. 1bls analysis emanated from UNTAC's Information and 
Education Component, Washington's bue within UNT AC, dominated by anti-
Vietnam vendetta types who were responsible for another disinfonnative tract 
after the election. It may have been merely the working of blind prejudice, or it 
may have had a covert purpose. Certainly no one outside that agency would have 
agreed with their figure for the CPP. Given Its date, we might infer that it wu 
to undermine the potential FUNCINPEC-CPP cooperation, by introducing a 
'confidential', authoritative UN assessment that the CPP wu extremely weak. 
unworthy u an election ally. If not leaked directly to RJNCINPEC, it would 
havebeeninterceptedby RJNCINPEC age.ntswithln UNT AC, suchu Norodom 
Siriwdh's wife, Christine Alfons Norodom, who wu employed in the Reha-
bilitation Component 34 
Elecdon results 
The final election results were announced by UNTAC on 10 July 1993 and 
officially poclaimed the next day; the new Comtituent Assembly held its open-
ing anmony on 14 June. In the ~ popular v~ RJNCINPEC won &pp"Oxi-
mately 4S per cent, the CPP 38 per cent. and the Buddhist Liberal Democratic 
Party of Son Sann nearly 4 per cent, with the rest Sift.Id among IDilo' parties. 
Since seats in the new Constituent ~mbly were determined propm:ionally by 
povince, the two largest parties have rep-eseotatives from all p-ovtnces except 
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the six povinces with only one seat each, where the largest vote detenniDed the 
seat. FUNCINPEC woo S8 seats, CPP St, BI.DP 10, and Moullnaka, the party 
which had the fifth largest total pqUar vote (1.37 per cm), one seat The fourth 
highest popular v~ was taken by Sak Sutsakan's Liberal Democratic Party, but 
they did not win eoough in any province to get a seat 
The complete failure of all other small parties to obtain enough votes to get 
seats, even with the advantage of proportional representation, was not expected. 
but it might be interpreted as showing a degree of polltlcal maturity among 
voters who realized that only the larger parties could govern. It showed further 
that the blatant Americanism of four or five of the small parties did not have the 
attraction for Cambodians which the leaders of those parties, and their foreign 
supporters, had expected. And some prominent figures from an older political 
generation who had remained outside Cambodia from the 1970s to 1991 must 
finally reali7.e that they are no longer of interest to the Cambodian public. is It was 
also a rejection of one common characteristic of most of the small parties: their 
antipathy for both Sihanouk and the Phnom Penh government In this connection 
it may be well to emphasize that the roughly 11 per cent of votes cast for non-
royalist small parties, plus the CPP' s 38 percent and BLDP' s4 per cent was that 
over half the electorate voted against monarchy and against Sihanouk. 26 
The collapse of In Tam's Democrat Party took most knowledgeable 
observers by surprise, and may have been the result of his own gaffes. His 
expected supporters would have been urban, educated, 'middle-class' profes-
sionals and state employees, who were anti-Sihanouk, and who did not want a 
return to traditional politics. Many such people worked loyally forthe PRK, but 
liked the idea of a more pluralist system, and would have been attracted by a 
party which represented an alternative to the CPP, but not rejection of all it 
represented. At the last joint rally of all parties just before the election, In Tam 
simply played the Sihanouk card, offering complete loyalty, which he said he 
hadalwayshad,andboastingthalhehadbeenoneofthefoundersofRJNCINPEC. 
He personally had been a loyal Sihanouldst until at least 1970, but that is not 
what the Democrat Party had represented. His potential voters that day might 
have thought that if they wanted Sihanouk they should vote for FUNCINPEC, 
and if they didn't, for the CPP. In neither case was Le Partl Democrat any longer 
an attractive alternative.27 
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The Cambodian refugee community, because of Its extremely low partici-
pation In the election, and because Its representatives (seven parties) were 
rejected by the Cambodian public, can be expected to have no further role in 
Cambodian politics. The Cambodian population showed 1hat It wishes to be 
governed by persons and parties which have e.lther remained in Cambodia 
during the difficult years, or, if not, are believed to represent Prince Sihanouk. 
1be method of proportional representation for allocating seats in the new 
Assembly - which seemed to be designed to weaken the CPP when it was 
expected 1hat the CPP would receive a majority of the vote - did not work as 
expected, first of all because of the near total rejection of the small parties and 
the unexpectedly poor showing of Son Sann's BLDP. 1be new Assembly, 
contrary to expectations, is essentially a two-party organ, with a small BLDP in 
a position to affect majority votes. Proportional representation has, however, 
performed its function of diluting the power of the party receiving the largest 
vote, that is FUNCINPEC. Had the election law incorporated the principle of 
largest party taking all seats in any election district, then AJNCINPEC would 
have won 79 seats to 41 for the Cambodian Peoples Party; and no other parties 
would have been represented in the Assembly. ::11 'Jbe designers of the election 
law would appear to have outsmarted themselves. 29 
Although FUNCINPEC 'won', it does not have a majority. Its most logical 
ally in a coalition, according to normal parliamentary procedure and the known 
Ideologies of the respective parties, would be BLDP, but their combined total 
of 68 seats did not get them the two thirds (80 seats) necessary to pass the 
constitution, and subsequently necessary to vote confidence in a government.'° 
Thus, drafting of a new constitution could have been blocked if cooperation 
between FUNCINPEC and CPP had not been achieved. Even the combined 
FUNCINPEC-BLDP majority which would normally have sufficed to form a 
government might be only theoretical, for those two parties do not have a 
national administratlvecapablllty; and continuing administration must count on 
support by the cadres of CPP. There must e.lther be open cooperation between 
FUNCINPEC and CPP in the future government, or AJNCINPEC must 
persuade a large number of CPP politicians and administrators to defect to 
FUNCINPEC." The leaders of the BLDP, and of the LDP- the party of 
General Sak Sutsakan which also derived from the KPNLF- have a history of 
opposition to and dislike of Sihanouk. which might prevent close cooperation 
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between them and FUNCINPEC, in spite of the antipathy of both toward the 
CPP, communism, and Vietnam. '2 
FJection irregularities 
When it became clear that AJNCINPEC would win, CPP called a press confer-
ence on 1 June to announce that they had complained since the beginning of the 
election. and were cootiDling to oomplain, about hregularlties in the election in 
three puvinces and Phnom Penh, and would request new electiom in those areu. 
Their complalnts coocerned lroken locks and seals on ballot boxes, disaq>ancies 
in llUlllbers of ballots coontecl compared to numbers of persoos who had voted. 
and 1~ of ballots. They said that lf their complaints were rejected, they woold 
refuse to ~ the results of the election. They also complained about bias on 
UNT AC' s radio, with deputy minister in the Prime Minister's Department, Khleu 
Kanharith, saying that 'in any future UN elections they must be more careful 
about the personnel of this component', that is, the Infa:mation and Education 
Component. 
UNT AC rejected CPP demands for new partial elections, although they 
could not but acknowledge that seals and locks had been broken and some 
ballots had been misplaced. Such defects were disgraceful enough given the 
funds and expertise available to UNTAC, but they probably did not effect the 
outcome of the election.» 
1bere was reason to oomplain about UNT AC radio, and Khieu Kanharith' s 
jibe about the personnel of the UNT AC Information Component which runs 
UNT AC radio, was ~ite. That component was loaded with Cambodia 
expertise, including its director, US State Department officer Timothy Carney, 
and the deputy director, Stephen Beder, both with long anti-PRK/SOC records, 
and who knew precisely what effect their work would have on the Cambodian 
public." 
1be specific oomplaint about them was that their broadcasts showed anti-
CPP bias just before the election and during the vote counting. They began 
broadcasting partial results at 7pm, on Saturday evening, 29 May (voting ended 
28 May). The first announcements enthusiastically said FUNCINP£C was 
ahead in four places (Phnom Penh. Kompong Som, Kratie, and Pursat), but no 
figures or percentages were provided, nor was there information about places 
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where the CPPmight have been ahead. 1bls was, moreover, contrary to a policy 
announced by UNT AC to publish the result in each province when its count was 
completed. The broadcast was repeated several times that night, and later the 
same evening they broadcast the totals counted for all parties in Phnom Penh. 
At that time CPP had received 4,336 votes, FUNCINPEC 7,S18, and all other 
parties only 2-3 figure results, all such results being so small as to be 
Insignificant Election Component chief Reginald Austin was interviewed, 
possibly unaware of what UNTAC radio was broadcasting In Khlner, and he 
said that they had some very preliminary results In twelve provinces. As 
UNT AC Information chief Camey cautioned In a broadcast the following 
morning, that was only 2 percent of the total vote. Thereafter every day UNT AC 
radio reported the total vote of each major party and emhasized the number of 
provinces 'won' by each, but rarely noted the proportional process which would 
determine the number of seats." 
Further UNT AC radio hanky-panky has recently been clw'ged by a Phnom 
Penh newspaper, which said that during the election period UNTAC radio 
jammed the Khlner Rouge transmitter andbroadcastFUNCINPECprogramson 
its frequency. That would have been totally illegal, and one wonders if some of 
the 'racist and inflammatory broadcasts' about which Akashi complained 
originated with UNT AC 12. 36 
The new regime 
After the election, UNT AC seemed to be f800<1 with a surprisingly united Cam-
bodian people who rejected the election and the UNT AC lnterveotion Itself. 
Sihanouk may have pulled off a coup as dramatic as the coup which deposed 
him in 1970, and which is constantly in his mind as he manoeuvres around 
UNT AC and domestic opponents. One might imagine him directing events 
from behind the scenes, but some of the incidents which gave him his advantage 
were fortuitous. 
Fortuitous was the lack of predicted Khlner Rouge violence to disrupt the 
election. One journalist who regularly writes about Khlner Rouge affairs, and 
who claims to have special contacts with them, said it was because Sihanouk 
made a deal with them. On the other hand, Stephen Heder said there was no 
change in the level of hostile Khiner Rouge activity during the election. 
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Accading to him they failed because they did not know where the polling 
stations were, and because of a good defence by SOC. 37 lbe good defence was 
true enough, but the rest of Beder' s explanation is peculiar. The Khmer Rouge 
must have known where polling stations were; and reports from most of the 
country said the level of hostile activity was indeed lower. Not all povince 
dwellers had been worried. On 25 June 1993 Joanne Healy, who had spent two 
years on an Australian project in Battambang, told me that they did not at all 
believe the Khmer Rouge in that area would try to disrupt the election with 
violence.31 lbere were reports from the northwest that on election days some 
Khmer Rouge actually came and voted, which means that they had registered 
to vote earlier, and suggests that there had never been a plan to attack polling 
places. 
1be second fortuitous circumstance was the poor showing of the CPP. Had 
the CPP taken first place, there would have been no complaints from them and 
no instigation of popular unrest, and they could have made their own deal with 
Sihanouk on much stronger ground. They had already recognized him as chief 
of state in 1991, and he would have had to choose between acting In that role 
alongside a CPP with legitimate power, or leaving in a sulk against an 
internationally recognized election. 
Of course, had the CPP won, FUNCINPEC might have rejected the result, 
and have been supported in their rejection by the US. This could have taken 
Cambodia from the 'Nicaragua solution' to the 'Angola ploy' (in which the US 
delayed recognition of the 'wrong' victor in an internatiooally suprvised free 
and fair election until the US-favoured loser was able to crank up the civil war 
again; see Herman and Brodhead 1984). 
Sihanouk's sudden return to Phnom Penh just before the election, after a 
long absence, may have turned the vote for FUNCINPEC. He himself claimed 
inamomentofpiquethatFUNCINPECwononlybecauseofhisarrival.'9Jnany 
case his role as political arbitrator was saved by CPP's loss, which opened the 
door for his so-far very skilful coup. 
His first move was to form a coalltion government of the two large parties, 
FUNCINPEC and the CPP. On 3 June, at S pm, Khieu Kanharith announced at 
a press conference that a new government had been formed under Prince 
Sihanouk, and that the State of Cambodia government was dissolved. 1be new 
government would be a coalition of FUNCINPEC and CPP, with Prince 
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Ranariddh offUNCINPEC and CPP Prime Minister Hun Sen as deputy prime 
ministe.rs. Kanharith added that a condition of SOC for consenting to the 
coalition was that the Khmer Rouge be excluded, which Sihanouk promised; 
Kanharith said, 'We hope he keeps his promise'. Each ministry would also have 
e»-mlnlstas, one from each party, and, in true Sihanouk fashion, a guarantee of 
ministerial instability. 
Prince Sihanouk's solution to the Impasse of a victorious party which was 
incapable of governing and a losing party which refused to give up power was 
outside and contrary to the Paris Agreement, and was in fact a negation of the 
election. It was nevertheless a positive move, because it averted conftlct 
between the two parties, and the danger of a new civil war, and it lnsum1 the 
collalxndonofthetwo largerpartles, witboutwhichCambodiacannotatpesent 
be governed. 
The US objected strongly. Akashi • s remarks were not encouraging. and 
Ranar1ddh asked for some changes before agreeing to participate. The following 
day. 4 June, Sihanouk, offended, renounced his project. 
If Sihanouk's announcement and dissolution of a government within 24 
hours was reminiscent of his 1960s style, the next act in this theattical 
production showed that the same techniques were being revived. In the 1960s, 
In the face of a political aisis, when his desires were blocked by opposing 
factions within his own Sanglcum, Sihanouk would threaten to resign and leave 
the Cambodian people to their fate In the hands of corrupt politicians. Soon 
thereafter 'spontaneous' popular demonstrations would be held and petitions 
sent to the palace by the 'people'. imploring Sihanouk to remain as head of the 
government or chief of state. The demonstrations sometimes turned into 
violence against the offenders, such as the attacks on the US and British 
embassies In 1964. 
On 5 June It was announced that a similar demonstration of the people's will 
would be held In front of the palace; then it was cancelled and people were told 
to return on Monday. 7 June. Without further announcement, on Sunday. 6 June 
truckloads of people were brought to the palace to listen to an extremely 
emotional speech by Sihanouk. accompanied by PrinceChakrapong, which was 
later broadcast several times. His main points were as follows. 40 
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many of the 1blrd World in Asia. 1ben we were left beblnd because of 
war. 
A few days ago I agreed to head a govmment uniting an parties 
except the Khmer Rooge. 'who do not agree', including BLDP and 
MonJinalca All would have been included in the ministries.'1 My ob-
jective was to make it just like the Sangkum of the 1 ~. 
Do not comider the Khmer Rouge as enemies. Talk to them. use a 
policy of peare. solidarity, lx'otherhood; the po!!cy of the two head 
monks of the Sangha; to save the poor and Indigent. 
Hun Sen and Chea Sim begged me to take over the government. I 
didn't dare refuse this request which came from the people [emphasis 
added- MV]. But there were obstacles; from certain fm:ign drcles 
which have an Imperialist and colooiallst policy. They say that if 
Sihanouk gets power as befcxe, he must be overthrown as in 1970. 
Because if he is allowed to pursue the policy of indepe~ neutrality, 
tenitroal integrity, etc., colonialism and Imperialism cannot win. they 
cannot <l1nk the blood of Kampuchea and the Khmer people, cannot 
pmsue a policy of ~on. Sihanouk must be overthrown. 
Now those foreign circles are giving al~ of money to some political 
parties which [long hesitationf2 do not follow Sihanouk. Whoever will 
oppose Sihanouk. keep him from faming a government, they will give 
those people a big budget, to cause Sihanouk's defeat. 
Some do not follow me. They set oonditions. they say that they 
follow Sihanouk, but they don't~ my fC.t1llula. don't agree with 
certain oonditions.'3So I can't fC.t1ll a government. 
Some Khmer politicians have told fm:ign ambas.wkn, 'We must 
resist, and not let feudalism return'." I never made feudalism in the 
Sangkum time; ask the daun chi, ask the achar.45 We had Peoples Coo.-
gresses every six IDODtm so that the people could say what they liked and 
didn't like. There was full freedom to speak. There were free elections 
fer representatives.46 And the throne was shade fer the people, just like 
my arrival now is shade, that's all. I have no wish fer power .... 
What should we do, if we can't have my coalition government? Let 
all four parties run their own areas. The Khmer Rouge area is IS per cent 
er 12 per rent of Cambodia, FUNCINPEC Im a smaller area, and Soo 
San an even smaller area etc.; SOC is biggest with over 80 per rent. I a.v.: 
them all to paea the people in theJr areas. Don't make war, raise the 
standard of living of the people, especially the~. 
I will remain as shade fer my 'children'.' I will stay. I won't leave 
now. But the government can't be fcrmed. The SNC uked me to be 
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president, to unite, but I C8DID unite, C8DID form all Imo a slngle sttaDd. 
So let each faction take respomiNllty towald the people. for hista"y, fer 
the mooks, and f<r the inlernational community who came to rule us. 
especially UNI'AC [empwls added-MV]. 
An elecdoo is very good. Some parties don't ~ the results; I 
wasn't given power by anyone to cqani7.e the elecdoo fer the peq>Ie, 
becaise the lmematiooal oommunity, UN, UNTAC took that power. I 
have DO power, I am only the shade. UNT AC bu total respomibility fer 
the election. I had ocdling to do with it; let them take respomiNllty. 
Can we guarantee peare in the future? UNT AC says they will rule us 
until August; at the end of August UNT AC will tum power over to the 
Khmer. 
Let SOC run their povinces {lists names}; and~ factions theirs. 
Wait fer September. I won't go anywhere. We will meet again. We ..e 
not yet~ not until September. 
Thus, In this speech Sihanouk accused UNT AC of trying to Impose a 
colonial, imperiallstruleoverCambodia. He disavowed the election, and finally 
he encouraged the four factions to divide and govern Cambodia on their own. 
The 6 June speech, in the oontextof Cambodian politics, was inflammatory, 
of the type which in the 1960s incited the people to violent action, stoning 
embassies, and attacking personal enemies. Also Inflammatory was another 
Sihanouk broadcast on the evening of9 June. While advising all parties to accept 
the election results, and to take their places In the new Assembly on 14 June as 
allocated by UNT AC, Sihanouk noted that 'UNT AC did not conduct the 
election in an entirely correct manner' . 
The violence which Sihanouk incited did not occur in Phnom Penh, and not 
immediately, DO doui. because of the strength of SOC police, and the aw&rent. if 
illusory, strength of UNTAC. It occurred when. on 10 June. Cllakrapong led 
some dissatisfied Cl'P leaders, in partiailar State Security Minister Sin Song, to 
Prey Veng and declared an autonomous zone, loyal to Sihaoook, in Prey Veng, 
Svay Rieng and Kompong Cham, in protest agaimt the 'unfair dection'. Inter-
estingly, Khmer-language newspapers reported that Chakrapong visited his fa-
ther on 9 June before setting off f<r Prey Veng. It is pobable that Sihanouk 
eocooraged, er at least acquiesced in, the move, which would later give him the 
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q>patunity to save the oountry from partition. When demomtrakXs in the 'au-
tonomous' povinces threateoed violence Sihanouk. in a lmadcast on 12 June 
emotiooally begged them not to hurt any UNT AC personnel, and said he had 
urged Akashl to withdraw all UNT AC personnel from those se.. In the same 
speech he virtually agreed with the secesaooists that the election was disbooest. 
and said he did not condemn their actions. 
There were also vague reports that the DCXtbeastem provincesofRatanaldrl, 
Mondulldri, and Stung Treng would join the autonomous zone, under the 
influence of General Bou 'lbang, former chief of the PRK army, and a member 
of one of the local ethnic groups in Ratanaklrl. 
The secession occurred just one day bef<re the oftlcial UNT AC anoounce-
ment of election results, which showed some surprises among the CPPwinners. 
Thirty-two CPP candidates whose listings should have put them into the 
Assembly had resigned leaving their places open for lower-ranking CPP 
candidates. 
An 'analysis' of this secession, prepared for UNT AC by Stephen Beder of 
the Information and Education Component, alleged that persons who headed the 
lists of CPP candidates in several provinces but were passedove.r (formally they 
resigned) as deputies in the new Assembly were in fact 'assigned to participate 
in the "illegal struggle" or at least to be prepared to move into such activities if 
the situation should deteriorate further'. perhaps as the nucleus of an alternative 
power structure should the CPP be defeated in the Assembly. 41 The reported 
plan ... was to rely on the parts of Cambodia east of the Mekong as a ''fall-back 
base area" ... in which to regroup and concentrate fm:es'; and 'it bas been 
decided to attempt to establish in Cambodia east of the Mekong an area which 
... is free of "enemy" influence ... UNT AC, FUNCINPEC and eventually the 
PDK [Khmer Rouge]'. 
According to Beder the 'original planning process repoltedly also included 
negotiations and arrangements with Viet Nam for the provision of support for 
the fall-back base'.* The CPP would not have been that stupid. Reliance on 
Vietnam in such a situation would have been the kiss of death politically. 
Beder linked the secession with the changes in CPP candidates chosen to 
enter the elected assembly. According to him, faced with unexpected def eat, the 
CPP withdrew some 'CPP members and assign[ ed] them to if not "illegal" then 
"semi-legal" or the possibility of "illegal" work' . 1bis is seen from an 'exami-
nation of the composition both of the group who stayed or were brought in and 
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of the group that withdrew'. A number of top CPP leaders, were kept in the 
Assembly. •Also kept in the Assembly were almost all the inteJlectua•s and 
otbets who could be described as the CPP' s"econocrats" and "technocrats", the 
Party's propagandists and educational and cultural workers, and its legal 
experts. Moreover, the ranks of these groups were expanded by CPP members 
from these categories [i.e. technocrats etc.] toreplacemoreseolorCPPmembers 
[whodldnotbavesuchquallficatioos J whoresignedthdrcandldacy'. Ukewise, 
'anotbec group kept in or brought into the Assembly were low-ranking CPP 
members from its structures in [the provinces]', while 'their superiors resigned'. 
Heder says, 'they seem to be in the Assembly in order to 'bold the fort' for their 
superiors, who are now assigned to ... maintaining and building upCPP strength 
in the most important provinces'. 
The inferences about types of persons included in the Assembly are true; it 
will be seen below that those put in the Assembly are more appropriate than the 
superiors who resigned. in te1'IDS of building a democratic regime in cooperation 
with other parties. They are also precisely the types of person who would be 
chosen by any rational party in a Western democracy. 
The two actions, resignation of some CPP candidates and foonation of the 
autonomous zone, are much better explained as quite unconnected manoeuvres. 
The autonomous zone. moreover, is better explained as an unexpected. ad hoc 
action by a few hotheads in protest against the election. perhaps also in protest 
at being dropped from the Assembly, and it was probably approved tacitly by 
Sihanouk both in protest against UNT AC, and to create an opportunity to gain 
aedit by exerting his moral authority to put down the autonomy movement The 
timing, the association of Chakrapong with Sihanouk between 6 June and 9 
June, and its quick encl, show that the 'secession movement' was not part of a 
long-term plan. and was not related to the choice of CPP candidates for the 
Assembly. Perhaps Hun Sen stole some of the aedit by absenting himself from 
the IS June meeting of the Assembly in the palace throneroom to rush off to 
Kompong Own to put the 'rebels' in thdr place. It remains to be seen how this 
will affect his future relations with Sihanouk. 
The final choice of deputies by the CPPto fill their S 1 Assembly seats is not 
at all sinister, but it reveals an interesting pattern and undoubtedly signals their 
strategy in the newly-formed coalition government and Constituent Assembly. 
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As part of the regfsttadon procedure all parties gave UNT AC lists of theJr 
proposed candidates for each p:ovince they were contesting. In general the 
parties listed far more candidates in eveey p:ovince than there were seats to win. 
For example. the CPP listed ten candidates for the six seats of . Banteay 
Meancbey, and twenty-six candidate for the twelve seats of Phnom Peab. This 
was obviously to makece.rtain that there would beenougbregfsteledcandidatea 
left if some resigned, switched sides, or met an untimely end. 
Whatever number of seats a party won in a province, thedepudes to occupy 
those seats were to be appointed automatically in accordance with the official 
listings of candidates submitted to UNTAC (remember that vota:s did not 
choose candidates, but only parties, and it was left to the parties to pick the 
successful candidates). This was the procedure followed by FUNCINPEC, and 
each of the 10 BLDP winners was first on his respective p:ovincial list 
As desaibed above, the CPP proceeded differently; 32 of their winners 
resigned, opening the way for others farther down the lists to assume places in 
the Assembly. 
In Banteay Meancbey the CPP got two seats, and they chose the first two 
namesonthatlist,whichisthusuncontroversial.ltshouldneverthelessbenoted 
that the two are General Ke Klmyan (aged 38), first vice-minister of National 
Defence. whom Heder characteri7.ed as a 'military intellectual', and Phet 
Pbaoour (55), a former teacher and Ministry of Education official who became 
supreme public prosecutor, with a prewar university degree in Cambodia and 
further studies in France. 
In Battambang, for their three seats the CPP picked numbers l, 5, and 6 of 
their list, respectively the important minister of the Interior, Sar Kheng (aged 
42), Nam Tum (46), and Oluon BundlOI (56), deputy governor and deputy 
p:ovincial party chief, over General Hui Savoeun. OuchBunchboeun, one of the 
hardest of old ex-Khmer Rouge hardliners, and Oum Samy, the governor of 
Battambang who gave UNT AC so much trouble.'° 
In Kompong Cham, following Hun Sen (42) who headed the list and the 
omitted Olakrapong, they picked number 3 Mat Ly ( 63), an old party stalwart. 
but perhaps more importantly an ethnic Cham; numbers 4 and 5, Olhuor 
Leangbuot (52), who has a law degree, was a judge before 1975, and is now in 
the Ministry of Justice, and Keat Chhon (59), a respected engbieer with 
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advanced technical studies in France before 1970, who worked under both 
Slllanouk and Lon Nol. Then they jumped over Commerce minister Nhlm 
Vanda. whom Heder classes among the mllltary with the rank of lieutenant-
general, and the little respected Health minister, Yim Chhay Ly. to take number 
8, SNC delegate Dlt Munty (52). an obviously desirable figure, with a law 
degree and experience as a judge before 1975; and number 11, a young 
intellectual and one of Hun Sen' sadvisers, Im Setthy (46). Theomitted numbers 
9 and 10 were the governor. Hun Neng. and Men Kuon. a Party Central 
Committee member, considered by some as a Chea Sim man.51 
In Kompong Chhnang, Kong Samol (57), an American-educated agricul-
ture specialist who headed the list. got in while numbers 2 and 3, Governor So 
Rin and Vice Admiral Nuon Sokh. were skipped in favour of Uk Rabun (42), 
deputy minister of Commerce, a former teacher, who was studying law and 
economics just before 1975. 
Kompong Speu and Svay Rleng are uncontroversial. The first three on each 
list also became the 3 CPP deputies for those provinces. They also include 
obvious choices. Party stalwarts Deputy Prime Minister Say Chhum (48) and 
Governor Hem Khan (42) (Kompong Speu) and Ms Men Sam An (40) (Svay 
Rleng). and in Svay Rleng the respected deputy minister of Justice. Chem 
Snguon (67), who had legal studies and experlence as a diplomat before 1975, 
and Him Chhem (54), deputy minister of Information. and a former teacher. The 
third Kompong Speu deputy, Samrit Pech (S 1), is deputy minister of Agricul-
ture, who studied in France in 1970-75. 
The three Kompong Thom deputies are number 1, Agriculture Minister 
Nguon Nhe1 (St), before 1975 a teachef' and provincial administrator; number 
3, Deputy Governor Un Ning (51), a former teacher with a pre-1975 university 
degree. who was praised by a European electoral officer for his cooperation 
duringtheelectlon;andnumber4onthellst.technocratCbeaChanto(42)ofthe 
Ministry of Plan. with number 2 ,Governor Cbeang Am. losing out. 
Similarly in Kampot. number 3, Governor nt Ream, was skipped for 
number 4, Ms Som Klmsuor ( 44), director of the CPP newspaper Pracheachun, 
to make up the province's three winning candidates. The other two were 
numbers 1 and 2. Nay Pena (45) of the Politburo and General Chay Salngyun 
(40), a former governor, deputy minister of Defence. and. according to Heder, 
another 'military intellectual'. 
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Kandal is mc:re iDteiestiDg in comparison with Heder's analysis. For the 
CPP's 3 deputies, m111>ber 1, Heng Samrin (agedS9), and mnnber 3, CheaSotb 
(65), are obvious c.hok:es from the old guard. but number 2 of equivalent party 
and government status, Say Phoutbang, was passed over, the most reasonable 
explanation being bis virtual retirement due to age and ill health. Catainly there 
is no way to linkblm with an 'autonomous zone' in the east. His own area is the 
1bai southwest. 'Ibethlnlmemberfrom Kanda! is deputy minister ofEducllion 
Mom Olbn Huy (S2), in place of adviser to the prime mlnister, medical doct« 
Kev San. 1be reason fer the choice ls not apparent. but it cannot be liDlced to a 
secession plot. and may be because Kev San spent the past twenty years in 
France, while Mom CldJn Huy n;mained in the coontry.52 
ADQlber iDtaeating case is Phnom Palh ~ mnnber 1, Chea Sim (61), 
and DUJDber 3, Im Olbun Um (St), minister of Education and an SNC member, 
we.re obvious cboices fer two of die four seats. Im Chhun Um. moreover, bas 
a prewar university deg=. Number 4, Thor Peagleat (SS), is an adviser to the 
government who studied law and economics before 197S and spent 1979-93 in 
France. Omitted werenumber2,old party member and Phnom Penh mayor Sim 
Ka and numbers S, 6, and 7, respectively: Sin Sen, deputy minister of Security; 
Cbann Sok, the very old president of the Supreme Court; and Dr My Samedy, 
also aged. topermittheappointmentof aJeadingCPPintellectnal and spokesman. 
mnnber 8, Kbieu Kanbarit (42). 
In Prey Veng the first three, Minister of Security Sin Song, Governor Yutb 
Pboudwlg, and Deputy Governor Toch Sakk. were skipped in favour of 
mnnbers4 to 7: TourismMinisterChheam Yeap(aged47), Deputy Minist.erof 
Education Ek Samol (49), veterinarian and Deputy Minister of Agricultme Pen 
Panha (S2), Vann Sunbeng (49) of the Natlonal Radio and Beaux-Arts School; 
and DWDbers 10 to 11 Bin Chbin (44) and Min Sean (48), deputy governors. 
skipping Oley Sapbonof thePartyCenttal Inspectorate and Mam Heng, another 
deputy governor. All of those chosen, except Min Sean, had some kind of 
ta'tiary education bef<X"C 197S, and five oftbem are under fifty years old. 
In~ Governor Ros Sreng, first on the list, was dropped. leaving Suy 
San (46). the young mlnister of Social Action, and Deputy Minister of 
Educllion Sar Kapun (SS). a well-known writer and educationist since bef<X"C 
1970. 
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1be successful candidates inSiemreap were Mlnista' of Defence Tea Banh 
(48), and llllDber 4, Long Hib (48), of the province organizing c:ommittee, 
dropping Governor Neou Sam. disliked by UNTAC. and Leng Vy, a deputy 
governor. 
Takeo is interesting in that DUJDber t. Genc:ra1 Pol Saroeun. was skipped. as 
was number 2. Govemor So Pbeanm. and DUJDber 4, FiDaDce Minister Cbbay 
Than. 'lbose cbosen are Minister of 1\'anspolt So Kbun (4), the well-known 
government spokesman Sok An (43). and Nin Sapbon (4S). deputy party chief 
of the province. 
In the single-member provinces. the CPP maintained the govemcn as 
deputies in Koh Kong, where it is Rung Pblamkesan (61). an ethnic 1bai in a 
Thai area; in Monchllldri Boeuy Keuk (S4). probably also of a local miDcxity (at 
least be is a local native), in Preah Vlllear Suk Sameng (39), a local native. and 
inRatanakiri the old revolutionary and local minmlty group member Bou Thang 
(SS). 1be Stung Treng governor. and candidate number 1, Sonn Sopha. was 
dropped. and replaced with bis deputy Van Vutb (39). The same thing happened 
in Kratie where Governor 1bik Kroeungwttba was replaced by Deputy Min-
ister of Health Cbbea 'lbaing (SS). a medical doctor since befm-e 1970, who had 
bis own private clinic, and who is oow deputy ministea' of Health. 
lbesblftinKratiewas at the last minute, and it is asinglecasewbicb I would 
accept as having been related to the secession effort. but not in the direction 
imagi!WI by Heder. The formal UNT AC announcement of winning candidates 
on 11 June named Tboek Kroeungvuttba. the govemcr of Krade Province. and 
m1mber 1 on the pre-dection list of candidates for that province. By 14 June, for 
the opening of the Assembly. be had been replaced by DUJDber 2 on the list. Dr 
Cbbea Thaing. All odBreslgnations andn:placements bad been effected before 
tbeoffidal UNTAC announcements were drawn up. In the newspaper Rubmei 
kampuchea of 18 June. 1boek Kroeungvuttba was reported as stating that be 
resigned from the Assembly because of pressing administrative duties. We 
should recall that Kratie was rumoured to have joined the autonomous zone, but 
apparently did not; and perhaps the a>P and SOC decided the governor sbould 
stay on in that position because ofllis loyalty to Phnom Penh against potential 
secessionists. FUNCINPEC, incidentally, classed him among the Hun Sen 
men." 
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ADOtber interesting detail is die position of Bou Thang, the deputy for 
Ratanakiri. He was not dropped from the final list. although be did not attend the 
openingoftbeAssemblyon 14June,andafewdayslaterSihanoukiocludedhim 
in the request fer Cbalaapong and Sin Song to return to Phnom Peob. He was 
reported to have cooperated with Cbalaapong at first, and to have brought 
R atanakiri, MODdulldrl. and Stung Treng into the autonomous zone. In the end. 
bowever,ltappearstbattbosenortbeastanprovlocesdidnotdeclareautonomy. 
Bou 1bang's moves and non-moves argue lllCll'e fer a spontaneous response 
to the political manoeuvres of the momeat than for a CCPplan; and 'repmedly' 
(that is, acccrding to the rumour mill), Bou Thang bas been acting with some 
p:eteDSions to autonomy, spending much time in R atanakiri, ever since be was 
moved unwillingly in 1986 from thepostsofDefence m.lnistei' and deputy prime 
mintstertosimplymemberoftbeStandingCCIDJDitteeoftheCenttalCommittee. 
1be cbo.ioe of CPP deputies certainly appears purposeful, ancJ the purposes 
arelngeneraltransparent.Celtainpel'S()ns,howevennedioa:etbeirparllmentary 
capabilities, had to be included because of theJr current party and government 
roles, but several others with equally long party service were omitted. Fleven 
provincial governors, a group generally considered as veteran, or hardllne. 
politicians, were passed over, and only five (in Kompong Speu, Koh Kong, 
Mondnlkiri, Preah Vilar, and RatanaJdri) wereiocluded as deputies. In all but 
the first of these cases die governors are natives in ethnic minority areas on the 
VJetmmeseorlbai borders, whichisexplanationeoougbfortbeJrimpcnmce54. 
The Kompong Speu governor, although not in a remote or minority area, like 
bis Preah VllJear colleague. is also one of the young CPP generation, aged 42. 
and be studied medicine during 197~75. 
Also excluded were most of the candidates with a military or security 
aervk:e background, while those included are two 'm.llltary intellectuals', 
according to HedeJ', and die Defence minister, who is of the young gene.radon 
(aged 48) and is an ethnic 1bai from the southwest. ss 
lbeCPPwasobvlouslytryingtolocludethemaxtmumnwnberofyounger, 
moreintellectua1membelsamongtheirdeputiesintbeAssembly.Atleast33are 
former teachers, or current membels of the Ministty of Education, or doc:tms, 
or have bad some university level education. The avenge age of the deputies is 
49.7; there are twenty-four under SO years old; and three llO'e under 40. 
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To the extent the new dep.lties can be identified with one or anotber of the 
hypothesized CPP factions, Chea SUD' s group appears weakened in favour of 
Hun Sen' s. Eigbl of the persons idend.fted by FUNCINPtiC as part of the 'Chea 
Sim Can' were skipped, with sevenstm among theCPP deputies, while fifteen 
of those whom the same source identified as in the 'Hun Sen aan· ll'C among 
the deputies, with only eight dropped. Six of the 'Hun Sen group' who wa:e 
dropped are proviDcial govemcn. and My Samedi, UQhrr Hun Sen man, 
although respected. was probably considered too old. The fifteen Hun Sen men 
who made it are among those wbcm I classed above as intellectnals OI' 
ixofesslonallycmipaewll OnlyonesucllpenonwbowasamcmgFUNCINPEC'S 
ll&tofthe 'Hun Sen clan', CbbaylhanoftheFlnanceMlnlstty, wuamongtllOle 
dropped." 
All of this probably indlcatcs siDcerity on the p1rt of the CPP to ooopente 
with FUNCINPEC in thedraftin&of a constitution and the future governance of 
Cambodia In this light the omission of Cbakrapong, number 2 in their 
Kompong Ol8D.llst, and Sin Song, who beaded theCPP list in Prey Veng, ralher 
than a plot to establish an alternative power bue, suggests removal of a bitter 
opponentofFUNCINPEC'sRanadddh,andageneralavoidanceofmllitaryand 
pollcepenonnel, whichisalsoinlinewlthadesiretoworkcaostrucdvelywitbin 
the new political environment. 
1be pattern of resignations and replacements suggests that the CPP really 
expected to win app:oximately a two-thirds majority in the Assembly. In 
genen1 the old a>P political leadenbip were among the top of the lists of 
proviDcial candidates, and the younger tecbDocraas and intellectuals, who 
ranked lower politically, were further down the lists. Since in the final choice 
the latter replaced their political supedcn, it is cJelr that the CPP had always 
expected that most of them would get in. H the lowest replacemeat in each 
province is taken as the bottom line of what tbey bad expected to win without 
any resignations, the total is 81 seats, « 67 per cent n 
The FUNCINPEC group in the Assembly is much less implessive. There 
ll'C a few stars from the old Cambodian elite who ll'C also well educated, such 
as the princes Ranarlddb and SJrlvudb, abalf-blotberofSibaoouk, Ranariddh' s 
brother-in-law, Roland Eng, Sam Raingsy, son of a famous Sihanouk enemy of 
the l9SOswhodisappearedinmystai011Scira•m•ances,andOlauSenOn1moo, 
son of a prominent businessman and politician of the l 9SOs-60s. 51 A few IDOl'C 
are highly qualified technically (Ing Keat. Pou Sotbirak. and the CPP defectors 
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Ung Phan and Kann Man. who owe their qualifications to their opportunities 
under the PRK/SOC during 1979-1989). In spite of their class and education, 
however, the FUNCINPEC elite have spent little or no time in Cambodia since 
before 1975, are without administrative or political experience, and may for 
those reasons be outclassed by the CPP." 
Most of the rest, however, perhaps more than forty, have no more than 
primary education, and no professional or administrative experience( other than 
primary school teachers before 1975); they were ordinary farmers under DK. 
and since 1979 either ordinary citi7.ens within Cambodia in a few cases, or 
already anti-PRKactivists in border milltary formations or guerrillas and agents 
inside the country.'° 
Son Sann's BLDP fielded a number of potentially capable people. One who 
stands out. though not elected, is Hem Krisna, first on their Kompong Chhnang 
list of candidates, who in 1980, in one of the few PRK trials which was given 
publicity, was sentenced to twenty years in prison for active subversion in the 
service of the non-communist anti-PRK forces on the Thai border. It seems that 
all such political prisoners, whether tried for specific offences or not, had been 
released. One of the small parties, the Khmer Nationalist, was largely made up 
oftbem.61 
F.nc:I or 'secession'' opening of the Awmbly 
On the evening of 9 June 1993, just when Chalaapong had set off to lead the 
'secession', aootheJ' Sihanook troadcast advised all parties to ~the elecdon 
results, even tmugh 'UNT AC did not oooduct them in an entirely ca:rect man-
ner', and to take their places in the new Assembly on 14 June as allocated by 
UNT AC acccrding to the election results. 
When the Assembly first met on 14 June, Ranariddh proposed that Sihanouk 
be declared chief of state with tenure unbroken from before March 1970 
(meaning, with the same powers as he had enjoyed before being deposed). This 
was voted by the Assembly by a show of hands. Sihanouk accepted. made 
remarks about the need to get away from foreign domination, and suggested that 
the Assembly should meet in the throneroom of the Palace, where they could be 
away from journalists and foreigners, and could discuss without keeping a 
written record. 6l 
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On ts June the Assembly met in the tbrooeroom, and the session was 
televised. Hun Sen was not p:esent, having rushed off to Kompong Cham to 
terminate the so-called autonomous zone. Heng Samrin. Cl1ea Sim, Ranarlddh. 
and Son Sann sat in the first row. 1be two latter assumed traditional obeequious 
poses, with bowed faces, hunched shoulders, and hands raised, palms together, 
in the traditional gesture of respect Cl1ea Sim sat upright with hands clasped 
halfway into that gesture. Heng Samrin sat still with a stony face and hands in 
his lap. Most of the deputies, like Heng Samrin, were expressionless, some 
taking detailed notes, not showing any signs of obeequious respect. Pedlaps this 
indicates that few deputies in eitbtt party like Sihanouk's manoeuvres, but feel 
unable to reach a solution without him. 
In the televised session Sihanouk said the Khmer must make the constitu-
tion, not f<Xdgners; in 1947 the French made a constitution, and then the 
Democrat Party objected and changed it: 'Didn't they, Samdech Son Sann?'" 
'They say we are still a Protectorate of the UN. Only Khmer can cook Khmer 
food so that it is good. 1be Barang [Westerners] don't know how.' 
Following the 16 June 1V broadcast of the IS June meeting, there were 
announcements that the p:ovinces involved in the secessionist autonomous 
wne had renounced that p:oject On the morning of 17 June Sihanouk's request 
to Chakrapong, Sin Song, and Bou Thang to return to Phnom Penh was 
broadcast, and at 11 :30 on the same day a meeting of Sihanouk with Hun Sen, 
Sin Song, and Chakrapong to discuss the new coalition government was 
broadcast and televised. Forgiveness for the rebels was immediate. 
A piquant question is: who gets credit for e.oding autonomy - Hun Sen er 
Sihanouk? If, as I believe, the plot was to some extent a Sihanouk manoeuvre, 
one purpose, after stirring up trouble and putting pressure on UNTAC and the 
CPP, woudbave been for Sihanouk to gain charismatic credit for terminating the 
threat to national unity. Hun Sen would seem to have preempted that by ignoring 
the Assembly meeting in the palace and flying off to K.ompong Cham, after 
which the autonomous wne collapsed. Did Hun Sen spoil Sihanouk's plan? Is 
Hun Sen showing open rivalry? If so, it will not be forgiven. 
Hun Sen may be in danger, not only as the leader of a party bated by 
FUNCINPEC, but as an orator who can compete with Sihanouk and Ranariddh 
on an election platform or on 1V. It must be doubly galling to the princes 
because Hun Sen is from a poor family background. with little formal education. 
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In the broadcast of the meeting of Sihanouk, OUllaapong, Sin Song, and 
Hun Sen the formula for the new government was announced. 1bere would be 
co-prime ministers, Ranarlddhand Hun Sen, and ministries would be 8RXJl1loned 
equally between the two major parties, with fewer ministries forthe BLDP, and 
perhaps one for Moullnaka. An interesting detail was Hun Sen' s insistence that 
the new government should be approved by a two-thirds majority vote, not a 
simple majority, as ls usual for votes of confidence.1bereseemedto be evidence 
here of the possible Hun Sen-Sihanouk tension. Hun Sen could be heard on 
television prompting Slhanoukwben thelatterdesaibed theproposal. Sihanouk 
said that although be had been given full power, be did want to use it, and be 
would not object if Hun Sen's proposal for a two-thirds vote was accepted by 
the Assembly, as it later was. It was clear, however, that Sihanouk would have 
preferred a simple majority on this question. Hun Sen insisted on entrenching 
the principle of a two-thirds majority from the beginning, to prevent the ejection 
of his party from the government by a coalition of RJNCINPEC and BLDP. 
By 16 June it seemed that all Khlner factions had in fact rejected the work 
of UNT AC. FJl'St the Khmer Rouge rejected them in advance. Then CPP 
rejected the election results as partly dishonest, and Sihanouk made remarks in 
support of their position. Then. Sihanouk, by totally ignoring the election, and 
calling UNT AC 'imperialist' and 'colonialist', alsodlsavowed the election. 1be 
only faction to firmly support the election results was FUNCINPEC, but in the 
opening of the Constituent Assembly Ranarlddh proposed that Sihanouk be 
declared chief of state without a break since before 1970, which partly negated 
the election by preempting part of the constitution-drafting process, and 
Ranarlddh has acceded to Sihanouk's request to cooperate in thecoalltion which 
negates the election. 
1be government 
1be composition of the 'Provisional National Government' was announced on 2 
July. 1be guiding pinciple in its formation was that each of the two major parties 
should have equal repesentatlon on the wOOle, and at all levels, in each mlnislry. 
In fact, of the 65 members of the govemmeot, 32 are CPP and 'J9 RJNCINPEC, 
but the equality of the latter has beat maintainOO by giving two ministries, F.oeigy 
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and Public W<rts, to Ing Kiet who is also a minister of State. Ing Kiet's 
accumulation of fuocti~ illustrates the ver:y shallow depth of FUNCINPEC' s 
talent pool, which bu fa:a:d them. u 'victa'S' to allow a fmnal maj<Xity toCPP 
in government personnel. Four poslti<D me held by Son Sann's BIDP and ooe 
by Monllrutka 
Another function of a bloated government was to give the maximum 
number of persons a chance at ministerial prestige, and thus coopt as many 
potentially infiuentlal persons as pos.tjble. lbls was clear in Sihanouk's post-
election discussions with party leaders, and fits well with his traditional 
governing style - to include as many mutually inimical figures as possible to 
facilitate his rule by playing them against one another. 
There were 28 ministries, in addition to co-presidents, vice presidents, 
'ministers of state', and ministers and vice ministers in the 'cabinet of the 
president', altogether eleven persons. Indeed two more (for a total of four) vice-
ministers in the presidential cabinet were added between the issuance of a 
document entitled 'Structure of the Provisional National Government' on 2 
July, and publication of the list in Phnom Penh Post (2( 4 ], 2-15 July 1993). This 
is considerably more than in previous governments under any regime, and there 
was even a proposal toexpand thenumberof minisUies to 34. PRKgovemments 
keptministerialportfoliosbelowtwenty,andSanglcumgovemmentsinthe 1960s 
were constitutionally limited to sixteen portfolios." A draft constitution which 
was unofficially circulated in Phnom Penh in September 1993 provided a limit 
of twenty members in the Council of Ministers, but in the final constitution no 
limit was imposed. 
The new government was headed byco-presidentsNorodom Ranariddhand 
Hun Sen, with co-vice-presidents Ung Phan and Keat Chhon. Keat Chhon is a 
highly qualified engineer whose own political history runs from Sihanouk's pre-
1970 Sang/cum through Lon Nol' s Republic, with some time as a DK supporter 
before joining SOC. Ung Phan has also moved around; until arrested for 
attempting to form a new political party in 1989, he was a ministerial-level 
official of the PRK. 
Two of the three ministers of state were also returnees who were already 
well known in their fields before 1970. Ing Kieth of FUNCINPEC is another 
engineer and Van Molyvann, who is listed as a CPP representative, is an 
architect 65 Ing Kieth also heads two ministries, Energy and Public Works, 
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apparently because his qualifications were so much superior to those of anyone 
else. The third minister of state was Hor Namhong, last foreign minister of SOC, 
who also has a background of Sihanouldst and then DK support before 1979. 
1birty-sevenofthe6S members of the government, fourteenfromFUNCINPEC, 
nineteen from CPP, the three from BLDP and Moullnaka's minister of Veter-
ans' Affairs, were chosen from outside the elected members of the Assembly, 
which is in conformity with previous Cambodian practice before 1975. 
Only two of the CPP nominees from outside the Assembly were among the 
candidates who resigned just after the election. They are Sin Sen, numbec S on 
tbe Phnom Penh list, who was then deputy minister of Security, the position 
which be was given in the new government, and Olhay Than, number 4 on the 
Takeo list, who was theit minister of Rnance, and is now deputy minister of 
Veterans' Affairs. Among the other non-parliamentary CPP members of the 
government at least twelve are persons with special technical qualifications or 
experience in PRK/SOC administration at ministerial level."' The CPP is still 
pursuing the policy which influenced their choice of assembly members, to 
bring in as many technically and administratively qualified persons as possible. 
F.qually interesting is that fifteen of the CPP members of government were 
once listed by FUNCINPEC as members of the 'Hun Sen Can', while only four 
were called 'Chea Sim Oan' by the same source; and none of the old politicians 
among CPP Assembly members, or alleged high-level Chea Sim stalwarts 
(Chea Sim, Chea Soth. Heng Samrin, Say Olhum, Sar Kbeng, Math Ly, Nay 
Pena, Men Sam An), are in the government The remaining ten CPP members 
oftbe goYemmeDt were not listed in FUNCINPEC' s 1993 Realith cambodgi-
mnes analysis. Uke the choice of Assembly members, the composition of the 
government signals a decline in the Chea Sim faction in favour of the more 
intellectual and technically qualified followers of Hun Sen. Although this 
becomes more speculative, it also seems that since it was obviously necessary 
to give a few ministerial spots to Chea Sim men, the CPP leadership, guided by 
Hun Sen, tried to keep them in posts which have little political clout Three of 
the four identifiable Chea Sim men are Deputy Minister of Tourism Sam Prum 
Monea, So Khun as minister of Transport, and Tram Eav Tekas deputy minister 
of Public Works, who are all carrying on in posts requiring some technical 
expertise, such as they held under SOC, but which are not of major political 
importance. The only reputed Chea Sim man in a politically powerful position 
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in the new government ls Sin Sen. one of four deputy ministers of Interior and 
Public Security, precisely the position be already held under SOC. 
Given these 'numbers', analyses which continue to characterize Chea Sim 
as the dominant figure in the CPP seem eccentric. An example ls David 
Chandler's desaiption oftheCPP as • ... divided lntosupportetsof OieaSlm, the 
party' sstrongman ... IDd those who suwm ... HunSen' (Cllandler 1993:7-8, ltallcs 
added). Chandler also says: 'Unfortunately, the major parties contesting the 
election offered the voters a replay of earlier tlmes ... Sihanouk (FUNCINPEC) 
and Chea Sim (PPC [CPP]) were known political quantities ... '. This suggests 
that the election was a contest between old generations. Yet. during the election 
Chea Sim was very nearly invisible, while Hun Sen vigorously led the CPP 
campaign. There was a suggestion of 'replay' - a certain parallel between Hun 
Sen in 1993 and Son Ngoc 1banh in the 1950s who then could challenge 
Sihanouk as an orator on equal terms, as Hun Sen has proved capable of doing 
now.67 If there has been a generational split in the Cambodian parties 
(FUNCINPEC, CPP, and BLDP), as Chandler suggests, power within the CPP 
seems effectively to have passed from Chea Sim's group to that of Hun Sen 
(Chandler 1993:7).111 
Chandler's analysis, in a disconcerting way, reflects Stephen Heder's 
disparaging treatment of Hun Sen in comparison to Chea Sim, as seen through 
the eyes of disgruntled old Khmer Rouge (Heder 1990a,b). Now, however, 
Heeler (1993) has implicitly disavowed his earlier analysis, holding that there is 
no significant factional division within the CPP.69 
Three ministers from the BLDP, Keat Sokun in Youth and Spons, Thach 
Reng in Rural Development, and Say Bory in Relations with Parliament, were 
candidates in the election, but not high enough on the lists to win seats in the 
Assembly. Keat Sokun spent 1980-1992 ln Australia; and Thach Reng spent 
several years in the US following the end of the war in 1975. '°Since, in addition 
to Son Sann who became deputy president of the Assembly, at least three of the 
BLDP Assembly members, Son Soubert. Ieng Mouly, and Pen Thol, have 
equivalent paper qualifications, BLDP may have taken advantage of the 
opening of ministries to persons outside the Assembly to increase their numbers 
within the state apparatus, but the choices may also reflect intra-party tensions 
which burst into public view between Son Sann and Ieng Mouly just before the 
election. 
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The Khmer Rouge 
One of the ostemlble puposes of the Paris Aa:ml, to neutra1b:e the Khmer 
Rouge by disarming them and 1xinging them iDfo the electaa1 pucess. was 
umucces.Wl. The Khmer Rouge refused to disarm. or to allow UNT AC inspec-
tion of theJr tenitay, and they deoouDced the election. 
When the election wu over, however, they loudly accepted the results, 
showing which had been their favourite party. For a few weeks it appeared that 
they might succeed in their goal of getting into the new government without 
having disarmed or faced the voten, because Sihanouk continued to speak of 
reconciliation with them, and FUNCINPEC policy had always been reconcili-
ation. in contrast to Hun Sen who said that after his party won they would 
proceed to destroy the Khmer Rouge OD the battlefield 
Because of this background, the sudden, and apparently very successful, 
offemive of the new combined army against Khmer Rouge strongholds which 
began in mid August, even though preceded by warnings from Ranarlddh. wu 
a surprise. 11 
This may mean that Ranariddh has OD this question acceded to Hun Sen's 
policy, and that togethel' they may finally succeed in ending the 'Khmer Rouge 
problem', at least in its present form. The mllltary successes, now reportedly 
followed by numerous desertions by the Khmer Rouge rank and file, demon-
strate how much the Khmer rouge depended on foreign support. This will not. 
however, end the threat of radical insurgence ifthe new government continues 
a policy which favours the wealthy urban population over the countryside. 
The joint offensive against the Khmer Rouge ls also a direct threat to 
Sihanouk, who wu counting on using them in his manoeuvres for personal 
power. Sihanouk's manoeuvres since the election indicate that, u in the 1960s, 
he has no respect for constitutional regularities, and will not hesitate to subvert 
the constitutional process to achieve his goal of near absolute power. His 
traditional political technique ls to build u large a coalltion u possible from 
incompatible elements, forthemorecontestingpartiesinhis coalition, the easier 
it ls for him to manipulate them. The two-party coalition which he proposed on 
3 June wu hardly sufficient for his needs, and be probably intended from the 
beginning to dissolve it on the slightest excuse, in order to confuse public 
opinion and make possible a wider coalition giving him greater authority. One 
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of the purposes behind the 'secession' would have been to multiply the factions 
and aeate tension among them which only be could control. It ls likely that 
henceforth it will be Sihanouk who will persist in including the Khmer Rouge, 
if they survive the unexpected onslaught recently launched by the coalltion of 
FUNCINPEC, the CPP, and the BLDP (see Thlon 1993, and forthcomlng).72 
The comtitution and the reorganb;ed Royal Government 
The constitution was drafted by a commi§ion consisting of thirteen members, 
eight substitute members, four experts, and the minister for Relations with 
Parliament. It was pesided by the pesideot of the Constituent ~bly, Son 
Sann or his vice-pesident, Chea Sim. Of 24 members. besides the pesidlng 
officers, whom I can identify, ten were CPP, ten were FUNCINPEC, and foor 
were BLDP. Aftem were ministers a deputy ministers; and nineteen were 
elected members of the .A§embly. 
None of the old generation of politicians from the CPP, or from any party 
for that matter, was included except Son Sann. and Chea Sim, potentially, in his 
capacity as deputy presiding officer, because he is vice-president of the 
Assembly. The commission's vice-president was Minister of Justice Chem 
Snguon, and the secretary (rapporteur as a more precise translation) was 
FUNCINPEC' s Tao Seng Huor, deputy minister for the Environment. Most of 
them are from the groups I identified above as intellectuals or professionals; and 
the shrill objections from certain NGOs in Phnom Penh that the constitution was 
being \\ITitten in secret by irresponsible politicians seem to have been misplaced. 
It seems to me that they are a generally non-Slhanoukist group." 
After some indecision, as to whethel"Cambodia would have a 'chief of state' 
or a king, the decision was made for monarchy. The reason for indecision, a for 
suggesting return to monarchy at all, which is certainly not the popular choice 
among the urban educated who dominate Assembly and government, is the 
Sihanouk problem. All parties are on record as considering that Sihanouk must 
occupy a leading position, if only ceremonial. Probably most, even within 
FUNCINPEC, want his role to be only ceremonial, not that of a powerful ex-
ecutive. 
Even if, however, as I believe, most of the leaders of all the political parties 
would like to see Sihanouk remain in Pyongyang without any input into 
domestic politics, the opportunistic political culture of Cambodia prevents any 
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of them from saying this. If anyone should suggest that Sihanouk be kept out. 
all the others, even if they agreed, would pounce on him with accusations of 
treason, or some equally serious offence. They are all mesmerized too by the 
belief that the 'people', especially the rural people, are devoted to Sihanouk, and 
that a reputation as anti-SihanouJdst would destroy whatever popular support 
they enjoy. 
On the ooehand, given Sihanouk's propensities, the decision for monarchy 
may be good for Cambodia, forthecountry'shistory during the 194<S-60sshows 
that in Cambodia it has been easier todraftaconstitutiondepriving a king of real 
powe.r than to limit the role of chief of state. On the other hand, Sihanouk 
probably has such a short time left to live that he could not do much damage as 
chief of state, while a monarchical constitution leaves the succession problem 
as a perennial source of conflict Perhaps there was fear that even in a brief term 
as chief of state Sihanouk would make a new deal with the Khmer Rouge just 
when the three other main factions had agreed to destroy the Khmer Rouge, and 
had the ability to do so. 
If monarchy is taken seriously as the long-term structure of Cambodia's 
government. rather than perhaps limited to Sihanouk's lifetime, succession 
conflicts will be inevitable, probably not between Norodoms and Sisowaths as 
before 1975, but among Norodom factions. At least four potential competitors 
may be identified among cwrent players: Ranariddh; Chalcrapong; the sons of 
Monique; and Sihanouk's half-siblings, children of King Suramarit. of whom 
FUNCINPEC's Norodom Sirivudh, the new minister of Foreign Affairs, is the 
most prominent. 
The new constitution has made Cambodia a monarchy again, with Sihanouk 
as king. In contrast to the old monarchical constitution, the king's power is very 
limited; this is so specific that it must mean there was significant opposition to 
restoring the monarchy. Article 7 says that the king occupies the throne, but does 
notholdpower,andthisisrepeatedinArticle17whichinsiststhatthisllmitation 
'absolutely cannot be amended'. Vastly different from the old monarchical 
constitution, according to which the constitution was 'granted' by the king, 
Articles 135-138 of the new charter make it clear that the constitution and 
parliament exist before the king and that he is chosen by them. 
The monarchy is elective. The king may not choose his successor. That task 
is given to the Royal Council of the Throne, consisting of the president of the 
National Assembly, who in the absence of a king becomes head of state; the 
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prime minister; the supreme monks of both Buddhist orders; and the first and 
second vice-presidents of the National Assembly." They must choose a new 
king from among the descendants, aged at least 30, offonner kings 'Ang Duong, 
or Norodom, or Sisowath', a redundant fonnulation, since the latter two were 
sons of Ang Duong, Sihanouk's great-great grandfather, through both his father 
and bis mother." 
The wife of the reigning king shall be given the title Preah Mohesei. This 
is not 'queen'. Accordlng to A<!Mmanl Leet~. that title was for the second 
royal consort of a king, whereas rules established by King Ang Duong do not 
include that title at all, and give the consort in question a quite different title. Of 
course, the wife of the now reigning king is not a princess by birth, and according 
to the traditional rules not entitled tosuchahightitle at all (Bitard 1957:563-80). 
The legislative body is the 120-member Assembly chosen in the May 
election, which, after promulgation of the constitution, has become the 'National 
Assembly', with a mandate for five years. The legislature is unicameral, like that 
of the PRK. but in contrast to the pre-1970 constitution and that of the Khmer 
Republic, both of which had partly appointed upper houses. 
The government consists of a prime minister chosen from among the elected 
deputies of the winning party. The other ministers, whose numbers are not 
limited, do not have to be members of the Assembly, but they may not be civil 
servants, businessmen, or industrialists, and they must be members of political 
parties represented in parliament (Article 100). 
The last stipulation, together with the very large number of articles setting 
out social, medical, and educational services which the state must provide, 
reflects the socialist ideals of the PRK. which must seem attractive to some 
members of the other parties too, in spite of the articles of the constitution which 
stress that Cambodia is to follow a market economic system. Indeed, to support 
the social welfare provisions of the constitution, which are far more extensive 
and detailed than in any previous Cambodian constitution, and, if implemented, 
would make Cambodia a true 'welfare state' ,the free market economy will have 
to be tightly supervised and subjected to heavy taxation, after western European, 
not US or Thai models. 
Provincial and lower level administration remains unchanged, and 'shall be 
administered in accordance with conditions set in an organizational law', which 
means that the PRK/SOC administrative structure is left in place (Articles 126-
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27). Apparently FUNCINPEC, reaU7.ed the impossibility of changing that, 
either in form or personnel, at the present time. 
The Provisional Government established following the elections has been 
greatly reorganiud in the new 'Royal Government of Cambodia' created OD 29 
October 1993 (Phnom Penh Post No. 23 5-18November1993). Near equality 
between the two large parties has been maintained, but some ministries have 
been combined; the total number of personnel has decreased from 65 to 51, of 
whom nine were still to be appointed. and the changes in structure and penonnel 
reflect jockeying both among the parties, and between the two apparent factions 
of the CPP.76 Twenty-nine members of the Provisional Government, twelve 
CPP, fifteen FUNCINPEC, and one each from BLDP and Moulinaka, were not 
kept OD in the Royal Government, which has eight new faces: four CPP, three 
FUNCINPEC, and the new seaetary of state for religious affairs who is listed 
withoot party affiliation. Of the nine to be appointed. at least five will be deputies 
to CPP figures, and thus presumably from fUNCINPEC. Probably a tenth. 
deptuy to CPP's Chea Oumto, secretary of state for plan. will also be appointed 
from FUNCINPEC, although this was not mentioned in the local press. 
The new line-up shows some gain for the Chea Sim group within the CPP. 
Chea Sim himself has moved up from vice-president of the National Assembly 
to president, displacing Son Sann, whose son Son Soubert is second vice-
president, with afUNCINPEC man as first vice-president. A presumed proteg~ 
of Chea Sim, Sar Kheng, has been brought into the government as a deputy 
prime minister and minister of the Interior, but he may be balanced there by Im 
CbhunLim of the Hun Sen group, a historian by training, an SOC ideologue, and 
a former member of the Supreme National Council. 
In Defence, however, the CPP side is represented by two of the youngest 
generals, Tea Banh and Chay Saing Yun, who were not listed in fUNCINPEC' s 
analysis of 'clans', but who are probably closer to Hun Sen than to Chea Sim. 
Of the twelve CPP members of the Provisional Government dropped from the 
Royal Government, six were of the Hun Sen group and three Chea Sim men. 
Still, of twenty-four CPP members of the government, eleven are consid-
ered of the Hun Sen group, with only two certain Chea Sim followers, while ten 
were not classified as to 'clan' in the FUNCINPEC analysis. Most of them, 
however, because of their relative youth or intellectual background, may be 
presumed closer to Hun Sen than to Chea Sim. 
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The first report of the Assembly debate on fonnationof the new government 
indicatedthatohserversshouldlnthefuturepayasmuchattendontoFUNCINPEC 
factions as to those within the CPP. Ranariddh complained that not all 
FUNCINPEC members voted for his proposals, and some of the disagreement 
concerned support for BLDP candidates, w~entry into the government was 
decided by horse-trading between the two big parties.77 There is certainly a 
faction within FUNCINPEC which is lukewarm toward monarchy, especially 
of the Sihanouk variety, and this faction is probably headed by Sam Ralngsy, 
one of their brightest young stars. 
Contrary to anti-PRK/CPPprognoses over the past years, a FUNCINPEC-
BLDP alliance is not a foregone conclusion, and younger, educated BLDP 
persons may find more congenial colleagues among the new CPP elite. 
When the new regime is shaken out, it would not be surprisingto see a new 
alignment opposing a group of technocrats and Intellectuals, mostly of the 
younger generation from all three parties, and In general non-royalist, to old 
CPP party stalwarts, royalists and opportunists. 
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wuTedNgoy. 
20Qne original Democ:nt atill llCtive is Son Sann, who tacitly acknowledged that party'• popular-
ity by taking ill old logo, a tbRle-bcadcd clcpbmt, 11111 elcmcot in the logo ofhia BlDP. Tbc:rc 
wu thus pouible confusion fm umophiaticak:d voten between lbc Dcmoaala, who used that 
party' a tradilional ayml:d.a. IDd lhc BlDP. 
21 The two institutes were lhc lntemaliooal Republican Institute (IRI) IDd lhc National ~ 
c:ntic Inatitute fur International Affairs (NDI), affiliated with lhc Amcricm pctica, IDd funded 
in Cambodia mainly by USAID. In Cambodia they were involved in election monitming, 
educating in campaign techniques, pmty organizing etc., but amoog the expcrta brought by IRI 
wu Raul Garcia Prieto, vice-prclidcnt of lhc El Salndonm ARENA Party, long identified 
(and now confirmed by an UN Truth Cmuniuion) •mainly rapomible for lhc de.ab aqua 
and maasacrca in El Salvador during the civil Wlf. 
22 'KR baa "upped ante" ahead c:I electiona', The Nation 17 May 1993. EvlDI wu both p-cdicting 
a CPP win, and indicating hia diataatc for it, with a hint of blaclanail - vote fer the CPP and the 
Khmer Rouge will attack. 
23 Details from their fRN confereocc in Phnom Paib, 19 May 1993. 
24Thia analysis. which wu anaiymous, bore lhc inimitable lita'ary style of Stephco Heda-. Sec 
below fur hia post-election analysis. The anploymcnt of Cbriatinc Alfooa Norodom WM one of 
the groucr manifestations of UNf AC' a vcnion of ncturality. 
25 Including In Tam, Chat Saroeun, both among the foundcn of FUNCINPEC, Sak Sutaakban, 
Cbcog Heng, Bum Hell, a cousin of Sihanouk, and even Son Sann, whole party wu expected 
to do much better than the ten scats they received. 
260b&ctvera of Cambodian affairs should not be misled by the participation of Son Saam' s factioo 
(then KPNl..Pbut in lhc clcction divided between hia own BlDP llDd Sak Sutsakhan'a I.DP) 
alongside FUNCINPEC in lhc tripartite Coalition Govemmeot c:I Democratic Kampuchc&. 
The BlDP and lDP, in ideology and pcnonncl, and quite diffcrcot from FUNCINPEC, and 
foreign backers hoping fer a coalition of thclC two non-communist groups may be disap-
pointed. 
27Io 1963, u govemcr ofTabo, In Tam bad been inwlved in the trellcbaowl 11TC1t, which led 
to Cllccutioo, c:I Prcap In, a fmner Democrat IDd Son Ngoc Tbanb llCtiviat. Sec Chandler 
(1991:133-34). 
28 Such a result would have deviated even DKR from the total popular vote, aix:ording to which 
FUNCINPEC would bave rated S41Cat1, the CPP 4S, BlDP S, and the rest going lo tc'Anl 
small parties. 
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29Jt is not certain they Wlllkd too ICrong a showing by FUNCINPEC eida. The US did not want 
a dominmt Sihanouk, and might have prcfan:d a ICrong bloc of the funner KPNIP putica, 
with support from FUNCINPOC and the cmiP putica. 
30 At Hun Sen' 1 imistmcc, the uaembly adopted a two-tbiJda JUlc for coofirmatioo of the 
goYCm1DCDL 
31 Thia 1CCma ID have been what the Amcricma bad in mind. lUoul Jenner, both in a public 
meeting in Phnom Penh and in print, quoted l<mCODC whom be identified U a 'ICDicr 
American UNTAC official', and whole identity wu tranapan:ot in Phnom Penh, u saying: 
'We can do without Sihanouk; we can do without the CPP; we have 90 million dollars to keep 
the officiala and soJdicn of SOC and to buy the CPP deputies DCCClllr)' to get a 2f3 majaity 
and put in pbcc the coalition of ourcboicc' (.JcDDll', 'Cmibodi.ln Cbroniclca' X, European F• 
Eaatctn Rcacan:b Caitre, Jodoignc, Belgium, 29 June 1993). 
32Tbcae two parties, and the parent organization KPNLF, arc led by aupportcn of the Khmer 
Republic in 1975. 
33Tbcrc wae abo 1CC11satiom d prejudicial behaviour by election penonncl wtating for 
UNT AC. but unfcxtunatcly tbcac were undocumented and anecdotal. Now, however, it appcm 
tbll a person dim:tly inwlvcd in election wort bu provided wriueo testimony, which will be 
cit&:d in a fortbcoming publication by an 1111hor who at prcllCDt wiabca to remain anonymous. 
Depending on the dc:taila, and whether similar tcatimony is eocouragcd from otbcn, UNT AC 
may rctrospccti~ly face cmbarnumcnL 
34Camey wu among the State Department officers llCti~ OD the Thai-Cambodian border when 
the US wu inwlvcd in 1etting up the Khmer Rouge again after their debacle in 1978-79, and 
Heda', since 1980, IUll bcco 11etive in anti-Phnom Penh popaganda- in particular, from the 
abclta of the Lawyers Commiucc for Human Rights and Amnesty Jntcmational, unloading 
rcpcdl which would not ha~ withstood criticism if prcacnt.cd u joumaliam m academic 
atudica(ICIC Vicbty 1988b:l08-116; 1987/1990). 
3!5 Thia, and fmtbcr rcfa"CDCCI below to radio md television broadcuta, arc baaed on my own 
listening and nxxirdinga. 
36 Reported in 'UN 1ammcd KR radio to aa~ clcctiom"', The Slllfllay Post (Bangkok). 19 Sep-
tember 1993:4. 
rt Beder'• JaJmk.a were in m informal coovaution with myself md twooda pcnooa OD 1 June 
1993. Pollibly Beder had bec:o rcapon1iblc for convincing UNT AC d a Khmer Roiuge ~It, 
IDd for the malyaia d incrcucd Khmer Rouge capeility quoted by Akubi in May (IOC lbovc, 
p. 12), which with bincbigbt ICaDI IO peculiar (be wished to maintain th& bis repcdiog had 
been accurate). 
31 Reacan:b should be undertaken to determine wbctbcr other cxpcricoccd oblcrvcn had aimi1ar 
imprcuiooa in other provincca. 
39Tbia w• OD 4 June when be dropped bis first propoul to catal>liab a FUNCINPEC-CPP 
coalition, and blamed bis aon Ranariddb for lack d cotbuaiam (IOC below). 
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'40The following ii a 1UllUD.u.ed pll'8phruc, not an cuct tranalD>o. although I ba~ kept 
cbcly to Sibanouk'a lmguagc. 
41 His remarlt that the Khmer Rouge 'do not agree' ii m intaating rcOec:tion OD bis l&titudc 
toward them. H they bad agRCCl. would be ba~ maugbt them in? lncideatally, bis original 
proposal did not include BLDP or Moulinlka. 
42 The long bcaitation bcrc ii becautc be wu OD the point of a ICrioua alipof the tLlngue. The pmty 
which wu rumoured lo be receiving aucb foreign. American, aid and cncouragcmcot WM bis 
own aon'a FUNCINPEC. 
43 Thia ii apparently a rcfa'CDCIC to Ranlliddb. 
44 Jt is not ca1ain ID whom Sihanouk wu referring. It aounda like somcooc from BlDP, or even 
non-royaliat membcn of FUNCINPEC like Sam Raingay. 
45 Dall1I chi arc the old ladies who abave their bcada, drcu in white, Ind take religious 'YOWi; 
acltar arc lay religious men who take carc of temples Ind ceranonics. Referring to them • 
authorities on politics ii typical of Sibanouk dc:magoguay. 
46Thc Congrcuea were tctaUy stage-managed; and clcctiona uodez Sihanouk were DlOltly aingle-
pmty t ainglc-clndidalc. 
47 Jn bis apcccbca Sihanouk habitually addrcslCd the Cambodian public u bis 'childn:n'. 
41 At a acminar at the Auatralim National University on 4 No'Vallbcr 19113, Profeaor Reginald 
A~ who beaded the UNT AC FJcction Campoocot, informed ua lbal all but one o{ tbolc 
who resigned acnt in identical lcUen saying they 'bad too much wcrk at the o{fice'. The 
exception complained of ill bcallh. Hcdcr's analysis wu a confidential UNTAC document 
entitled 'CPP Scccaaion. Resignations from the Allcmbly Ind Intimidation of UNTAC: 
Background and Tbcoica', da&cd 13 June 1993, by UNTAC 12 'Deputy Director (Analysis) 
Stephco Hcdcr'. 
491bia, interestingly, ii the line of the ixo-Kbmcr Rouge ncwspapa-, Oiulomlr.ati K1uner('Khmcr 
ideal'), which OD the front page of ill issue of 22 June published a map-cartoon showing 
UNTAC in cooperation wilh the Khmer Rouge 'pulling' the affected provinces bec:k from a 
Victnamcac magnet. 
SO 'Governor' is morc inciscly chairman o{ the Provincial Peoples Committee. 
St Hun Ncng is Hun Scn's brotbcr, and ii said to be airrupt and unpopular. Some people blamed 
the CPP lou in Kompong Cham on bis wipopularity. 
52Hcder, incidentally, put a question mark aft.er Kev San's name and clulCd him among the 
'throw-aways'. My information about bis background came from a chance IOcial meeting in 
the company of mutual friends. 
53The FUNCINPEC analy1i1 ia in 'La nomcoklatura commaniate cambodgienne', 
Realitls cambod1iennes, No. 2, (Phnom Penh), Mars 1993. Sec further below. 
54The ranaining govcmon wae either not on the liata of candidatea, or too far down to be 
relevant ID the diacuuion, or in the single-member Sibanoukville wbicb CPP bt to 
FUNCINPEC. 
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SS Jn the 1bc1t bioppbical lkctcbca c:I the CPP dcputiea in the CPP nevnpapcr Pradteachon, No. 
23 ( 1373). 20 June 1993. DO militll'y tidea at all~ included. 
56Tbc FUNCINPEC lmlyais is in~ cambotl1i6nnes. No. 2. Min 1993. I am not CODlid-
ering ochc:r'l li.stcd in that IOUl'CC who were too f• down the lists lo ba'V'C been in the nmning at 
all. Hcdcrdid notc:lusify tbmeclroppcd by 'elm•. and one of bis new menages is lbatthcie is 
no such saioua split in the CPP. in conlrut lo what be wu writing cbn=c years ago (tee Hcder 
l 990a.b; Vickery 1991). Among tbOle cbolcn by the CPP u dcputica. boweva. Hcder called 
S. Khcng, Say Clibum IDd Miit Ly 'Chea Sun Stalw1111'. while aaigning none to Hun Sen, a 
clear piece of obfusc:atioo. Bcaidea thole dRe. Samrida Pich. Meo Sam An. Him Chbcm, So 
Kbun. Nay Pena. and Chea Sim himlclf ~ Aucmbly membcn who Ml'C listed by 
RJNCINPEC u ''Chea Sim Clan' . Since, It the time. bodi calcgorizaticm, for FUNCINPEC. 
Ml'C c:oaaidcml equally deroglklry, we may uaume that they wa"C scrioua and involved 
mful examination c:I the UIOciationa c:I the pe:noDI involved. Of coune, the vo:y idea of 
r.cticnal rivalry within the CPP, which baa certainly been cxaggc:nled by their foreign 
encmiea. is of uncertain validity. 
57 Thia type of analysis shows that they expected to do b8dly - that is. win only half or leu of 
the ICIU (and their prognocia wu a:curate)- in Bantcay Meancbey (33 per ecol), Kompong 
Speu ('° per cent). and Kandal ( 4S per cent); IDd expected DO DlCR Ihm (J() per cent in Svay 
Ricng. where their cbn=c ICIU ~ S6 per cent c:I the kUl. 
SI Norodom Sirivudh is 100 of Sihanouk's faabcr. King SlnllWit. by the accaod wife. not Qucco 
~amat. Tbae wa"C at lcut cbn=c such offaping. Just O'V'Cl' a month afta' Sihanouk'• 
lbdicaDan in Mm:b 19SS infavourofbisfaabcr. Surammt. theJownalQO'icielpubliabcdKm 
(dcc:ree) 48 PR. dated 21 Apil 19S5. grmting moolbly allowmca 'lo ourchildral Their Royal 
Higbne11e1 Norodom v~ [pinceaa), Sirivudhi. and Preyuopboo [pobmly princcu)' . 
F«clctailaoo Sam Rainpy•a fUbca'Sam S.y, tee0•ndlcr(l99l:n, 92, 99-100); Chandler, 
boweva, is miltlkcn lbout tJUpodei. which meam 'powa,., not 'democracy'. 
S9R.anariddb hardly ever liwd in Cambodia aincc lldolclceoce. In the early 19<i0a be wu ahcady 
in France for cducltioo. returning once or twice a ye. for well-publicized family vilita. 
60fn bis article (tee Far Eastlm Economic Revilw 8 July 1993). N.ae 1bayer said tblt lbout 40 c:I 
RJNCINPEC' 1 58 assembly memben wa"C c:I this type. In the llllt week c:I June 19931 Wll 
able lo obWn 38 CV 1 from the RJNCINPf.c otrace in Phnom Penh (they said the rest bad not 
been CIOlllpiled), including thole of Ing Keat. Pou Sod1irak, Ung Phan and Kano Mao. IDd 
found that ova 30 of them Ml'C c:I insigoificaot background. 
61 The trial Wll reported in Koni tap padiwal ('rcwlutioouy ll'Dly•). No. 7, June 1980; ICC 
Vickery (1986:119). 
62 Thia iofClllDltioa is from penoo1 who wa"C among the guests at the opening c:acmooy. They 
also reported that the abow of hinds for Sibaooult u cbief c:I Italic since 1970 wu not 
nnanimooa, but Ml'C unable lo identify the abltainen. 
63 Thia wu an ammiog jibe at Son Smo. which abowcd Sibaooult'a elephantine memmy for 
aligbll. In 1946 Son Sann Wll a member of the Democ:nl Piny which bad won tltal Cooatitu-
cot Aucmbly elec:tioo. and they indeed reviled the CXJ01titutional draft popoecd by the Plaacb. 
Digitized by Goog I e 
The 1llta would ba"Ye been more fa\'OUl'able to Sibmouk. while the Dcmcxnll' draft. which 
wu. with a few modificatiom, acccpecd, dimjnjalwf bis authority. 
The fint draft popoecd by the French (by a 'Franco-Khmer' c:ommi•lioo) WU diltinc:tly 
CClDICl'Vati'Ye. Univcnal suffrage WM ~cctcd; the National Allcmbly wu ID be eJecliccl by 
provincial councilkn, tbemaclvea eJccted by communal councillon directly elected only at 
that low level Legislative powc:I' rested with the king, and the monarchy WM to be bc:Rditary in 
descent from Sihanoflk. 
The A11embly, or perhaps really its Danocnt Party majority, prcpll'Cd motbci' cbft incorpo-
rating dim:t election of the National Aucmbly, which would have legislative powas, and this 
WU the COllltitutico which WU adopted. Succeuion to the t.brooc WU vcstcd in the tlacen-
danls of King Ang D110ng, Silranovk' s great-great grandfather, leaving the way open for all of 
Sihanouk's royal rivals. The contemponry (1946) press docs not auppcrt David Cbandk:r'a 
intcrprctation in The Tragedy of Cambodian History ( 1991 :29), that the danocratic modifica-
tions to the French draft were p"OpOICd by Sihanouk. 
64 Con.stit111ion dM Rayaume dM Cambodge, Article 79 (later amended to Article 96). 
65 Among bis works ll'C the tbcatrc between the Floating and Cambodiana hotels and the Olympic 
Stadium. 
66Thcac arc the ones known to me at the time of writing. I have no knowledge of the background 
of Sum Manith in the Cabinet of the President, Heng Vong Buncbbat, deputy minister of 
Higher Educalion, Cbbum Eam. deputy minister of Religion.. Var Huot. minister of Cmunc:n:e, 
or Nouth Narang, minister of Fmc Arts. Nevcrtbclc11, Nouth Narang bu published a book. 
Angkor silencieux, in France, which suggests competence in bis field. Heng Vong Buncbbat, 
deputy minister of Higher Education, wu trained in law bcfOR 197S, and was in the Liberal 
Democratic Party of Sak Sutsakban, an offshoot c:I Son Sann'• Khmer Peoples National 
Liberation Front, until be joined the CPP following the election. In Dccanbcr 1993 I was 
informed that be bad moved again, to FUNCINPEC. 
67Having written a book with a large selection on the 1950s (Cbandk:r 19111: chapters 2,3), 
Chandler should ha"Ye been more acnsitive to this replay. 
68Cbandler (ibid.) would sccm to have been mistaken in suggesting that tbcrc was a 'lack d 
mechanisms, and perhaps allo the inclination, to transfer powa- from one generation ID the 
next'. 
69Parallel to Hcdcr's treatment is Chandler's: 1a)mong many fcreign observers, and urban 
Khmer, Hun Sen is thought to represent a more liberal and open-minded segment of the party, 
but evidence fer Ibis is bard to find in bis rcc:ent speccbca and in bis bcbavicr in the aftcnnadl of 
the PPC' 1 recent defeat .... The dynamics of the Chea Sim-Hun Sen rivalry arc coocea1cd from 
view, and papered O'Yer in public .... What is certain is that Chea Sim bu spent at 1cut forty 
years in the Cambodian Communist movement, while Hun Sen, at least twenty-five years Chea 
Sim' a junicr, joined the Khmer Rouge as a teenager in 1970 or sbortly before'. 
This, at least, should be one good rcuon for Hun Sen to appear more atlnctive to 'fcreign 
observers, and urban Khmer', although awamity not to the Hcdcr-Cbandler school c:I Cam-
bodia analysis. Sec Hcdcr (l 990a.b. 19113) and Vickay (19111 ). 
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'°Keat Sokun' 1 bKkground WM reported in Bangkok Post 28 September 1993 ('Inside 
Indochina', p.4). 
71 Thia h• bocn reported in detail in the Ba11gkok Post and Tlte Na1ion (Bangkok), during 
Auguat-Dcc:anbcr 1993. 
721bc incfidian made heft, in October 1993, leCIDI to be coming true: ICC 'Ranariddh ready fur 
CClltitution ~VllDp talb', New Srrails Twtes 7 December 1993, ~pcxting that Ranaiddh and 
Sihanouk~ trying to find a comtitutiooal way to include lbc Khmer Rouge in lbc go\lmUDCOt 
and It lbc same time margiDanli7.c Hun Sen. 
73 The otbcn. with pmty aftiliMioa. in crdcr of their official lialing, 'l't'a'C: Kan Man (F), Kelt 
Cbbaa (C). Chbu<r lung Huot (C). Thau PcogLc.t (C). Smi Rangay (F), Silowatb Shint (F), 
Son IOUbcrt (B), Semi Chanbot (F), Un Ning (C), Loy Sim chhcang (F), Cheam Y cap (F), Pd 
Ham (B), Pcu Sotbirak (F), Sar Sa-ll (B), Ing Kelt (F), Out Rabun (C), Ung Pboo (C), Et 
Samol (C), Say Bay (B). Chan Sokh (?), Chboolcm (C), Heng Vong Buncbbat (C), Khicu 
R.lda(F). 
741bc provision fer 1bc president of 1bc National Aaanbly to bcc:CJmc head c:I stale in the 
ablcocc of a Icing ia taken ova- from lbc pre-1970 c:omticutioo. 
7Slbc pre-1970 c:ooatitution merely stipulated that dcaa:ndanb c:I Ang Duong were eligible. I 
suspect that lbc new formulation ia designed with certain specific princca in mind, but I am 
unable to undc:ntand who Ibey might be. 
16 >.. rcpxtcd in Pltnom Penh Post, the new govcmmcnt bu 42 members. but lbc Khmer news-
paper ReaJrsmei Kampuchea of 30 October rqxl1Cd thlt nine mere al* ICa'Ctarica and deputy 
stale ICa'Ctarica nmaineod to be appointed. The delay DO doubt reflects intra- Of inta-pmty 
rivahty. The ministries c:I Bducllim IDd Higher F.ducation c:l lbc Proviaiooal Govc:mmcnt 
have been RCOIDbincd, u Ibey ~ unda- lbc PRK/SOC in a Ministry of F.duc.tioa, Y outb 
and Sport; Tnmpatalioo bu been merged with Public W<da; Vctt:raDI Affairs ia merged 
with Social Action; lbc Civil Service Ministry bu been abolilhcd; and lbc ministries of 
lndmtry and Minca, and F.nergy have been combined in lbc Ministry oflndmtry, Minca and 
F.nergy, ~lieving Ing Kiet c:I ooc of his portfoliol. 
77JterMuntbit, 'CabinctCunprcmilc',PltnomPenhPost2(23),S-18NoYCmbc:r 19113. 
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APPENDIX 
Government personnel, July-November 1993 
Presidents: 
Norodom Ranariddb • (F) 
Hun Sen• C'}l 
Vic:e-pesidents: 
Ung Phan• (F) 
Keat Choo. (C) 
Cabinet of the president: 
54 
Veng Sereywtb• (F) 
Nou Kanoo (F) 
SokAn• (C)D 
Sum Manitb (C) 
Prime minist.ers: 
Norodom Ranariddb •, first 
Hlm Sen• (C'}l second 
Deputy prime ministers: 
Norodom Sirivudb • (F) 
Sar Kbeng •t (C)C 
Ministry of Council of Ministers: 
Veng Sere~tb• (F), Min. 
Sok An• (C}l, Min. 
Sum Manitb (C), Sec. State 
Nou Kanoo (F), Sec. State 
Secretariat under Council of Ministers: 
Mok Maretb (C'}l. Sec. State, 
Environment 
Hong Sun Huot (F), Sec. State, Rural 
Dev'L 
Say Bory (B), Sec.State, Rel. w/ 
Assembly 
Keat Sokunm (B), Sec. Swe, 
Women's Affairs 
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Appendix (continued) 
Ministers of Swe: 
Ing Kiet* (F) 
Hor Nam Hoogt <C'Ji 
Ministries: 
Defense: 
Nor Ranariddb* (F) 
HunSen•(nh 
Tea CJiamiih (F) 
Tea Banh* (C) 
Interior/Security: 
Nor Ranariddb* (F) 
Hub Sen* (C'Ji 
y OU Hokkry* (F) 
Ditb Munty*f (C'Ji 
Toan Chay t (F') 
Sin Sent (C) c 
Fmanc::e and Economics: 
Sam Raingsy* (F') 
Cham Prasit <C'Ji 
Ministtn of Swe: 
Ing Kiet* (F) 
Keat Cbboo* (C) 
Van Molyvann (C) 
Chem Snguon• (C) 
Sam Raingsy* (F) 
Ung Phan* (F) 
National Bank: 
Thor Pen Leat*0 (C), Pres. 
Tiouloog Somura0 (F), Vice-Pres. 
Defence: 
Tea Banh* (C), Min. 
Tea Cbamralb (F), Min. 
Chay Saing Yun*0 (C), Sec. State 
Ek Scrywatb* (F) 
Interior: 
Sar Kbeng*0 , (C)C, Min. 
You Hotkry* (F'), Min. 
Khan Savoeun*0 (F), Sec. Swe 
Im Chhun Lim*0 , Sec. Swe 
Economics and Finance 
Sam Raingsy* (F), Min. 
Chem Prasit (C'Ji, Sec. State 
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Appendix (continued) 
Foreign Affairs: 
Norodom Sirivudb* (F) 
Uch Kim An <oh 
Industry and Mines: 
Pou Sothirak* (F) 
HuILimt(oh 
Energy: 
Ing Kiet• (F) 
Ith Prangt <oh 
PIT: 
Ung Huot• (F) 
Phan Phint <oh 
Higher F.ducatioo: 
ToILabt (F) 
Hen Vong Bunchbal (C) 
Tourism: 
Eng Roland*t (F) 
Sam Prum Monea• (C)C 
Health: 
Hong Sun Huot (F) 
Chbea Thaing• <oh 
Religion: 
Chhim Sick Lengt (F) 
Chhum F.amt (C) 
For. Affairs Intemat1 Cooperation: 
Norodom Sirivudb* (F). Min. 
Uch Kim An <oh. Sec. State 
Industry. Mines. Energy 
Pou Sothirak*. Min. 
[to be appced] Sec. State 
PIT: 
Sop Kbun• (C)c. Sec. State 
[to be appled] Dep. Sec. State 
[merged with F.ducation. Youth and 
Spons) 
Tourism: 
Veng Sereyvuth• (F). Sec. State 
[to be appted] Dep. Sec. State 
Health: 
Chea Thaing* <oh. Min. 
[to be appted] Sec. State 
Culture and Religion: 
Heang Vannaratb (7)0 , Sec. State 
[to be appled] Dept. Sec. State 
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Appendix (continued) 
Pronsiolllll ro•'t, Jul1 1993 l 
Public Works: 
Ing Kiet* (F) 
Tnmi F.av Teet (C'f 
Informadoo: 
Kbieu Kanlmitb* cd1 
Et Sezeyvadl* (F) 
Justice: 
Chem Snguoo* (C) 
Sam Kanilba*t (F) 
Coounm:e: 
VarHuot(C) 
Lu Lay Srengt (F) 
Agriculture: 
Kong Sam 01* (C'/1 
Loy Sim Olbeang*t (F) 
Transportalioo: 
SoKbun*fc~ Nou Sang t (F) 
Envirooment: 
M<* Mareth (C'/1 
Tao Seng Huor (F) 
Royal ro•'t, 29 Octoba 19932 
Public Works and Transport: 
Ing Kiet* (F). Mio. 
[to be appced] Sec. State 
Infmnalioo: 
Ieng Mouly*0 (B). Min. 
Kbieu Kanbaritb* (C'/1, Sec. State 
Justice: 
Chem Snguoo* (C). Min. 
Heng Vong Buncbbat (C), Sec. State 
Commen:e: 
Var Huot (C), Min. 
[to be appced] Sec. Stare 
Agriculture, Forestty. Fisheries: 
Kong Sam OI* CCJl. Mio. 
Tao Seng Huor* (F), Sec. State 
[merged with Public Works] 
Social Action and Veterans Affairs: 
SU)'. Sem* (cP 
[to be appled1 Dep. Sec. State 
[Secretariat of Council of Ministers] 
S1 
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Appendix (continued) 
Y outb and Sports: 
Keat Sokun (B) 
Orm Rassady*t 
Plan: 
Chea Cbanto* (C) 
Lay Prabost (F) 
Culture and Fine Arts: 
Nuth Narang (C) 
Michel Traoett (F) 
Civil Service: 
PrakSokt )C 
Tan Sin Tot (C"/1 
Rmal Development 
Thach Rengt (B) 
Chea Songt (C"fl 
Veteran Affain 
Prum Vannaryt (M) 
Cbbay Thant ccl1 
Education: 
Mooi Chim Huy* (C"/1 
Relations with Assembly: 
SayBory(B) 
Khieu Radat (F) 
Education, Youth and Sports: 
Ung Huot* (F), Min. 
Mooi 01im Huy* (C"/1, Sec. 
Stale 
Plan: 
Chea Cbanto* (C), Sec. State 
[to be appled] Dep. Sec. Slale 
Culture and Arts: 
Nut Narang (C), Sec. Stale 
[to be appled] Dep. Sec. State 
[abolisbed] 
[Secretariat of Council of Ministers J 
[me.rged with Social Action] 
[me.rged in Education, Youth and 
Sports] 
[Secretariat of Council Ministers J 
Digitized by Goog I e 
Appendix (continued) 
Notes: 
1 Sowe•: PhnomPenhPost2-lS July 1993. 
2 Sowe•: Phnom Penh Post S-18 November 1993. 
Kl, to 9mbols m«I: 
• = Assembly member 
C/F/B =party affiliation: 
C = CPP; F= FUNCINPEC; B = BLDP 
(C)C =Chea Sim bloc 
(C)h =Hun Sen bloc 
t - not in 'Royal Gov't' 
0 =not in Provisional Gov't 
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